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THE POLITICS OF LEGAL REASONING:
CONCEPTUAL CONTESTS AND
RACIAL SEGREGATION
LAWRENCE E. ROTHSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
Positivist jurisprudence relies upon an extensive set of par-
ticular legal rules, the careful distinguishing of the rules themselves
from their political and moral evaluation, and a strict analytic
separation between legislation and adjudication. Only in the rare,
previously uncontemplated case which can be subsumed under no
easily articulable rule do positivists argue that a judge is free to use
moral and political considerations, as would a legislature, to "make
new law."' Recent critics of positivism reject this dualism of binding
rules versus moral and political discretion. They suggest that there
are unarticulated moral and political principles that provide the in-
terpretive background for the system of articulated legal rules and
for the decisions in cases where the legal rules are not adequate.2
Ronald Dworkin, the most thorough of these critics, suggests that
judges must make only such "decisions as they can justify within a
political theory that also justifies the other decisions they propose
to make."3
*Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Rhode Island.
1. These characteristics are shared by such otherwise diverse jurispruden-
tial thinkers as Jeremy Bentham, J. Austin, H.L.A. Hart, Alf Ross and H. Kelsen. See,
e.g., J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1863); J. BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED (1945); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); H. KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE (A. Wedberg, trans. 1961); A. ROSS, ON LAW
AND JUSTICE (1958); cf. Hart, Legal Positivism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 418
(P. Edwards ed. 1967).
2. This criticism has been voiced on several levels. See R. UNGER, LAW IN
MODERN SOCIETY (1976) (positivist assumptions are linked to a period in history and a
social order undergoing conflict and change); J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE
LAW (1976) (criticizes the positivist regard for rules as "masks" which hides the per-
sons and institutions about whom the law ought to be concerned); Tribe, Structural
Due Process, 10 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS - CIV. LIB. L. REV. 290 (1975) (suggests that in ap-
propriate situations relying on unarticulated understandings is a more humane mode of
legal procedure than promulgating written rules); and R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1978) (mounting a general attack on positivism's emphasis on a system of
rules and the separation of description and evaluation, and arguing for the importance
of principles, policies and other, often unarticulated, standards in judicial decisionmak-
ing).
3. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 87.
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This article attempts to develop an alternative to positivism by
extending the present criticism. Focusing on desegregation litiga-
tion, the article will illustrate the dialectical process within which
judicial (and legislative) decisions are constrained in both routine
and hard cases.
I shall argue that legal reasoning depends on the comparison
and contrasting of complex sets of facts which are organized and
understood by means of concepts. The formation of these legal con-
cepts reflects certain social purposes for which the use of the con-
cept is intended. The legal concepts are never neutral, but lead to
particular judgments about the facts which they characterize. Each
concept also relates to other important concepts, and the relation-
ship between concepts articulates a political theory. Therefore, the
formation and use of legal concepts are necessarily political.
The political nature of legal reasoning manifests itself further
in conceptual change. Legal concepts have a history which reflects
the development of a political community and the legal institutions
of that community. The concepts change over time. They may
change in an incremental way at the borderline of usage-often they
change radically, reflecting a different organization of phenomena
and purpose. Characteristic of a concept in the process of change is
"essential contestedness." An essentially-contested concept is one
whose internal structure and relationships to other concepts is the
subject of dispute. The dispute cannot be conclusively settled by any
logical test or agreed upon empirical evidence, but can only be settled
politically by compromise, or by the gathering of preponderant sup-
port for one or another version of the concept. This means that legal
decisions are less constrained by formal legal rules than positivists
maintain. Also, contrary to positivist theory, legal decisions are
always constrained by political ethical perspectives that underlie the
life of a community.
Litigation involves disputes over important legal concepts.
Legal reasoning and judgment in these matters are political and
ought to be self-consciously so. (I use political here in its best sense,
i.e., concerning collective decisions about what human life in a com-
munity ought to be like). Adjudication properly requires the clear
recognition and statement of the political nature of the judicial deci-
sion. Legal commentary properly takes two forms. The first or pre-
liminary form is the articulation of the political theories behind legal
decisions. The second or advanced form is the criticism of these
political theories. In this article, I present this theory and practice of
legal commentary in the context of desegregation litigation.
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CONCEPTS AND LEGAL REASONING
Modern legal reasoning is a technique for analyzing complex
fact situations.' Legal rules, so-called "black letter law," are eight-
eenth century vestiges for public consumption, the unprepared law-
yer and the cramming of a first-year law student.' Judges and
lawyers compare and contrast cases, analyze similarities and dis-
similarities, and attempt to articulate a position with the similarities
and differences deemed relevant. Finding, evaluating, and articulat-
ing the similarities and dissimilarities between cases are done in
terms of legal concepts. The concepts direct attention to certain
facts and communicate judgments about the relevance of similarities
and differences between cases.'
4. See Montrose, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 587 (1957);
E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH, 45-69 (1951); Llewellyn, The Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent, 14 U. CIN.
L. REV. 208 (1940); Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J.
161 (1930). These commentators emphasize the analysis and comparison of cases as the
focus of legal method. Law teachers have been refining this technique since
Christopher Langdell.
5. "Black letter law" is characteristic of the classificatory legal science of the
eighteenth century which viewed law, like early biology, as a taxonomy of legal prin-
ciples deductively derived from fundamental principles. The work of Blackstone in
England and Kent in the United States is illustrative of this earlier conception of law.
D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 20 (1941) (an analysis of
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND in terms of its relationship to the
intellectual currents of its time); P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 121-34
(1965) (an analysis of the influence of Blackstone on the legal intellects of post-
revolutionary America). The work of Holmes is rooted in the modern "inductive"
method of case analysis. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Howe ed. 1963) ("But we must
bear in mind that the law deals only or mainly with manifested facts; . . ." at 185); J.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 133-71 (1970) (Frank attacks the notion that rules
of law are the basis of legal decisions and argues that the continuing discussion of
rules is to cover up the realities of the highly political and often irrational process of
judicial decisionmaking); Rheinstein, The Case Method of Legal Education: The First
One-Hundred Years, 21 U. CHI. REC. 3 (1975) (noting that the theory of the case
method is that the law is a phenomenon unfolding itself through cases in the course of
history and that reported cases are the raw data of an empirical science). This change
in the method and conception of legal science and training is analogous to the changes
in punishment and medical science documented by Michel Foucault in DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH (1979) and BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (1973).
6. E. LEVI, supra note 4, at 1-9; K. LLEWELLYN supra note 4; R. DWORKIN,
supra note 2, at 96-100; cf. H. PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 51 (1972) (suggests
that legal reasoning by comparing and contrasting cases or examples is supported by
the use theory of language developed by Wittgenstein in his later work, PHILO-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1958)).
Generally, a concept mediates between facts or phenomena and human
understanding. A concept is therefore a set of capacities: a) to know the meaning of
and to use the word or words that signify the phenomena; b) to recognize instances of
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For example, the legal concept "attractive nuisance" does not
merely stand for those situations which have been considered attrac-
tive nuisances in the past. This concept also directs the
practitioner's attention to those factors which may lead to character-
izing a never-before-experienced factual situation as an attractive
nuisance. It sets out the crucial dimensions along which relevant
phenomena may vary: danger, attractiveness and accessibility to
children. The concept "attractive nuisance" requires a certain class
of persons to protect children from the dangers of which they are
unaware. Cases illustrate factual variations of situations which pose
a danger attractive to children. Obviously these cases do not ex-
haust all the forms such conditions might take.
Lawyers understand elements of previous cases and thus form
the concept "attractive nuisance" in order to guide their analysis of
other situations which may also be attractive nuisances. No ar-
ticulated rule or definition adequately covers all possible attractive
nuisances and yet excludes all situations which should not be con-
sidered attractive nuisances. But comparing and contrasting a new
situation with others in which the concept "attractive nuisance" was
used leads to a judgment about the application of the concept in the
new context. The concept groups otherwise disparate phenomena
into a system of relevances which responds to human needs and pur-
poses. In this case the need and purpose is protecting children.7
Legal concepts far exceed legal rules in importance because
concepts embody legal reasoning. A rule merely sets out formal
categories. One must be able to use these categories by identifying
relevant phenomena and making required connections between the
phenomena. Having the rule does not entail these abilities. A con-
cept such as "attractive nuisance" or "racial segregation," for in-
stance, enables lawyers to recognize fact patterns that constitute an
attractive nuisance or an instance of segregation. The lawyer can
thus distinguish those situations which are not segregation or attrac-
the phenomena and to distinguish those instances from other phenomena; and c) to ap-
prehend the properties which make the phenomena what they are. Heath, Concepts, in
2 ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY 177 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
7. Edmond Cahn has suggested that "attractive nuisance" is a concept used
to protect the special, fresh and wondrous world of childish perception, which does not
associate the new and the unknown with danger. E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 73-74
(1955). For a more general treatment of how concepts make sense out of phenomena by
grouping them from the perspective of human purposes and needs, see W. CONNOLLY,
THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 19-41 (1974), JULIus KoVESI, MORAL NOTIONS (1967),
and Schutz, Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences, in SOCIAL THEORY
AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 12-13 (Emmet & McIntyre ed. 1970).
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tive nuisances and, most importantly, can imagine hypothetical il-
lustrations of these concepts. Concepts are thus the foundation of
legal reasoning
CONCEPTS AND JUDGMENTS
Different groupings of phenomena occur according to different
purposes for using legal concepts. Concepts are used in order to
make judgments about the desirability and responsibility for chang-
ing the states of affairs that the concept characterizes. Concepts,
which often appear as descriptions of or shorthand notations for
phenomena, conceal judgments about the phenomena
8. H. PITKIN, supra note 6, at 51. Compare works on legal reasoning cited in
note 4 supra, with Heath, supra note 6, at 177; S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 5-6, 21
(1960); and Rothstein, What about the Fact-Value Dichotomy?: A Belated Reply, 9 J.
VALUE INQUIRY 307 (1975) on conceptual analysis.
9. For example, in order for an observer to say that a group of people who
are placing X's on a sheet of paper are voting, he must know that these people have
some concept relating to choice of persons for political office or choice of policies, and
that they understand that their X's in some way express their choice. It probably also
will be important to the observer whether the people understand that the X's will be
counted and that the total will be related to the outcome of the choice. Who becomes a
leader must be considered of some importance to the people. If, upon questioning, the
people observed answer that the important thing is the aesthetic quality of the pattern
of X's on each paper, the observer will probably conclude that this is not voting and
that voting is not a part of the social world of this group of people.
Taking this example further, suppose that the sheets of paper with X's are
taken before a priest of the community. He contemplates the papers, goes into a
trance and finally announces the names of the community leaders made known to him
through the patterns of X's on the papers. In this extension of the example, suppose
the observer is known to the community because of the courage and wisdom he had
shown during a recent flood, and he is accorded a great deal of respect. He observes
the activities aforementioned and conceptualizes the process as an "election," because
it allows for each member of the community to feel that he has participated in the
choosing of leaders and it bestows in the popular mind legitimacy on the leaders
selected. He explains this conclusion to the people of the community and adds that
where he comes from there are also elections which, despite differences in technique,
serve the same purposes. Upon hearing this from a person whose views and way of life
are highly respected, the people of the observed community are very happy and
satisfied with their selection procedure.
On the other hand, the observer might conceptualize the process as a "selec-
tion ritual" because of the religious or mystical elements and the fact that no voting,
ie., neither the preferences nor the making of X's, has any calculable bearing upon
who becomes a leader. The selection is performed solely by the priest who generally
seems to choose the persons who have done the most for him recently. The observer
relates his conclusions to the people and adds that where he comes from leaders are
selected by an "election" in which people express their preferences between can-
didates by voting, and the ones who receive the most votes become the leaders. How
then might the people regard their selection procedure? If their respect for the
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The Aristocratic Concept of Segregation
The concept "racial segregation" has four important uses that
impart differing judgments about the causes, desirability, and reme-
diableness of racial segregation.0 Holders of the "aristocratic con-
cept" of racial segregation use it to characterize a situation as
longstanding, natural and desirable, and therefore subject to legal
sanction rather than remedy." Chief Justice Taney's decision in
Dred Scott v. Sanford"2 rested on such a concept. He approvingly
declared:
They [blacks] had for more than a century before been
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether un-
fit to associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and
observer and his views is great enough, they may act to change their procedure. At
least, they would not be as comforted as they had been by the first conceptualization
of the observer.
Both conceptualizations are based on the same observed phenomena. Both are
reasonable and could be supported by current theoretical perspectives. Each tends to
carry with it a different judgment about the observed institution. Whatever concept
the people of the community accept will have a bearing upon the institution by which
their leaders are chosen. To an important extent, the concepts by which political life is
characterized will constitute that political life. Connolly, Theoretical Self-Conscious-
ness, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL THEORY 43 (Connolly & Gordon ed. 1974); S.
TOULMIN, FORESIGHT AND UNDERSTANDING 101 (1961); Gellner, Concepts and Society, in
RATIONALITY 18-49 (Wilson ed. 1970); R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 87.
10. W. CONNOLLY, supra note 7; Kiltgaard, Institutional Racism: An Analytic
Approach, in RACIAL CONFLICT, DISCRIMINATION, & POWER: HISTORICAL AND CONTEM-
PORARY STUDIES 9 (Barclay, Kumar & Simms ed. 1976); Freeman. Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Brest,
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword.- In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
11. C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 48-49 (1966) (also noting
that in the South the aristocratic concept could lead to more moderate treatment of
blacks by the upper classes than by the lower classes who have a more corrupted ver-
sion of the concept); THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD 11-16 (R. Bardolph ed. 1970) (reviews
the writings of the popularizers of the aristocratic concept); E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JOR-
DAN, ROLL (1976); T. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1964); L. LIT-
WACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1860 (1961); F. LOGAN,
THE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1876-1894 (1964); C. WADE, SLAVERY IN THE CITIES:
THE SOUTH 1820-60 (1964); J. WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH
CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1877 (1965); C. WYNES, RACE RELATIONS IN
VIRGINIA, 1870-1907 (1961).
12. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See also Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.)
198 (1850) (upholding segregation in Boston city schools and expressing the view that
blacks are naturally inferior).
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that the negro might justly be reduced to slavery for his
benefit."3
Taney cited legislation dating from colonial times intended to main-
tain segregation." Users of the "aristocratic concept" of segregation
presume the natural inferiority of blacks. This presumption explains
and justifies their acceptance of the social, political, and economic
superiority of whites and the insistence on separation from blacks.
The aristocratic concept implies no legal or moral duty to remedy
segregation but rather implies a duty to maintain separation."5
These judgments are hidden in the criteria of the aristocratic con-
cept and flow from the use of the concept.
The Conservative Formalist Concept
The "conservative formalist" concept of racial segregation was
reflected in the Civil War Amendments which attempted to end out-
rageous treatment of blacks. The conservative formalist's condemna-
tion of these practices, however, was purely formal. The purpose of
the concept was to maintain racial separation. 6 Thus, the scope of
the concept's application, and hence the amendment's application,,
was severely restricted. Formal recognition of the right to be free
from racial segregation, and of a corresponding duty of others not to
segregate, was overshadowed by criteria limiting the agents whose
acts constituted segregation. Only the officials of a state acting ac-
cording to the state government's express policy of excluding blacks
were considered perpetrators of segregation by the conservative
formalists. The state's incidental support of longstanding private
customs and attitudes was not considered to be an imputation of in-
13. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. at 407; cf. F. DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 293 (1962) (he characterizes this passage as stating a "historical
fact").
14. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. at 408.
15. C. WOODARD, supra note 11, at 70 (indicates that the reconciliation of the
North and the South and the gutting of the Civil Rights effort, known as the Period of
Redemption, was due in part to the widespread acceptance of the inferiority of blacks
due to the aristocratic concept in the South and the conservative formalist concept in
the North). Cf. R. LOGAN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT: THE NADIR,
1877-1901 (1954).
16. State cases upholding school segregation viewed race as a reasonable
classification. State laws requiring segregation were mere "regulation" not amounting
to an abridgement of any rights granted under the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments. See Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874); People
ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883); Lehew v. Brummel, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W.
765 (1890); State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871); Ohio ex rel. Lewis v.
Board of Educ., 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 129 (Dist. Ct. 1876).
Rothstein: The Politics of Legal Reasoning: Conceptual Contests and Racial S
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
88 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
feriority by the state and, therefore, not racial segregation. Only
complete exclusion of blacks from a right or benefit specifically pro-
tected by the Constitution or federal statute suggested a likelihood
of segregation."7 The gist of the conservative formalist's use of the
concept of racial segregation recognized the formal reciprocity of
legal right and legal duty and the granting of some rights to blacks
by the Civil War Amendments. This recognition was not allowed to
disturb an older lifestyle and the attitudes which supported it. 8
Judicial use of the conservative formalist concept of racial seg-
regation is well-illustrated by the Supreme Court's decisions in the
Civil Rights Cases 9 and Plessy v. Ferguson.° The Justice Depart-
ment in the Civil Rights Cases aggressively prosecuted owners of
public accomodations under the Civil Rights Act of 1875 for the
owners' refusals to serve blacks. The Court dismissed the cases on
the grounds that the Act was not passed within the enforcement
power granted to Congress by the thirteenth or fourteenth amend-
ments. The Court maintained that the Act struck at private wrongs
17. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). In Cruickshank,
the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of. whites who broke up a political
meeting of blacks and conspired to prevent them by force and intimidation from
voting. The Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but this provi-
sion does not . . . add anything to the rights which one citizen has under
the Constitution against another. The quality of the rights of citizens is a
principle of republicanism. . . . The only obligation resting upon the
United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the
Amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the National Govern-
ment is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.
Id. at 555. Cf. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (also dealing with voting
rights); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) (striking down a state cause of action against
a steamboat owner who excluded a black woman when she refused to accept racially
designated accommodations).
18. This development was characterized by President Rutherford B. Hayes:
The evils which afflict the Southern States can only be removed
or remedied by the united and harmonious efforts of both races, actuated
by motives of mutual sympathy and regard; and while in duty bound and
fully determined to protect the rights of all by every constitutional means
at the disposal of my Administration, I am sincerely anxious to use every
legitimate influence in favor of honest and efficient local self-government
as the true resource of those States for the promotion of the contentment
and prosperity of their citizens ....
Inaugural Address, quoted in THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 11, at 30; cf. note
15 supra and accompanying text.
19. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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which could be redressed only under state law. These wrongs were
neither badges of servitude nor acts of the state. By citing with ap-
proval the treatment of free blacks under the regime of slavery
("mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded
as badges of slavery""1 ), the Court made it clear that its concept of
segregation did not go beyond prohibiting the formal legal relation
of slavery. Justice Harlan, in dissent, pointed out that the majority's
concept of segregation assumed that race discrimination in no way
asserts the inferiority of those discriminated against or, on the
other hand, that the natural inferiority of blacks justifies legalized
differential treatment.' In either case, the Court found no justifica-
tion for requiring anyone to remedy the disadvantageous situations
in which black patrons found themselves. 3
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the conservative formalist concept of
segregation allowed the Court to uphold a state law requiring
racially-separate train accommodations. While formally according civil
and political rights and equality to blacks, the Court did not con-
demn state laws requiring separation of whites and blacks in the en-
joyment of public facilities.' The Court, per Justice Brown, concluded:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and
the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and
political rights of both races be equal one cannot be in-
ferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be in-
ferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United
States cannot put them upon the same plane.25
If Jim Crow legislation did not create inferiority, but merely
recognized natural inferiority, then under the conservative formalist
concept racial segregation had not occurred. If segregation had not
occurred, no one could be required to remedy it. 6 Again, a judgment
21. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
22. Id. at 48.
23. In Bradley's words:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to
the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach
or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other
matters of intercourse or business. . ..
Id. at 44.
24. 163 U.S. at 544.
25. Id. at 551-52.
26. Id. at 550-51.
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was hidden within, and flowed from, the structure of the concept of
racial segregation.
The Liberal Formalist Concept
The liberal formalist concept of racial segregation recognizes
that the Civil War Amendments established specific rights and
duties with regard to the treatment of black individuals. Under the
liberal formalist view, the responsibility for remedying racial segre-
gation arises upon the identification of specific intentional acts,'
agents and victims. 8 The concept is more liberal than the conser-
vative formalist concept in several ways. The act considered need
not be total exclusion of blacks from a benefit. The agents need not
be government officials and need not be acting in strict accordance
with express governmental policy. The time focus of the inquiry into
the segregative character of an act could be extended back to its
origin or forward to its likely effects.
The expanded scope of the concept reflects a genuine condem-
nation of racial discrimination.' Even with an expanded scope of ap-
plication, however, its formalism is manifest in the proof necessary
for the imputation of responsibility to remedy conditions of racial
separation.' The concentration of the concept upon specific acts and
27. Recent cases require a racially discriminatory purpose or intention before
a disproportionate racial impact can be used to prove an equal protection violation. E.g.,
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The following three desegregation cases should be read in
light of the requirement of discriminatory intent: Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406 (1977); School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam);
Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977) (per curiam). See also Comment, Reading
the Mind of the School Board- Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinc-
tion, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976); Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose
Under the Equal Protection Clause; Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt.
Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 725 (1977).
28. This view is often characterized as the "anti-discrimination" or "non-
discrimination" principle. See Brest, 90 HARV. L. REV., supra note 10. For an analysis
of this view with regard to the position of groups as actors and victims, see Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 107, 168-70 (1976).
The requirement of injured victims of discriminatory acts allowed the Supreme Court
to look benignly at the closing of facilities to prevent their integration in Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (closing of a public swimming pool) and Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435 (1970) (closing of a public park).
29. See Fiss, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF., supra note 28, at 157-60; Comment,
12 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV., supra note 27.
30. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Con-
stitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36 (1977) (a full development of the tort no-
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individual actors and victims allows correction only of the identified
actor's proven acts against the individual victims, whether or not
the elimination of the effects of those acts would improve the condi-
tions of the victims or those similarly situated.3 For example, in
Milliken v. Bradley,32 the Supreme Court refused to require con-
solidation of Detroit's city schools with schools in the surrounding,
predominately white suburbs, despite the fact that an integrated
school system could not be achieved otherwise. The Court would not
impute responsibility for segregation in Detroit to all-white
neighboring, but jurisdictionally separate school systems unless
those systems were shown to have engaged in intentional discrim-
ination." The Court's liberal formalist concept of segregation did not
include as criteria for its application the racial isolation of the subur-
ban and city schools, the tradition of local autonomy that maintained
racial isolation, or the land use and housing policies which prevented
easy black migration to the suburbs.3' The concept's requirement of
specific acts, individual agents and victims tied together by proof of
intentional discrimination prevented placing responsibility on
anyone for correcting the conditions under which the black students
suffered.
The Liberal Pluralist Concept
Unlike the liberal formalist concept, with its emphasis on indi-
vidual agents, a "liberal pluralist" concept of racial segregation
regards groups as the relevant agents in racial segregation.35 Perti-
nent to this concept is the disproportionately low representation of
a racial group in a beneficial activity or position and the dispropor-
tionately high representation of the group in any disadvantageous
tion of proximate cause in antidiscrimination litigation); Nerken, A New Deal for the
Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the
Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV.
297 (1977) (analyzing and reevaluating the unrealistic barriers the state action require-
ment places before attempts to reach technically private, but essentially public, ac-
tions).
31. See Kiltgaard, supra note 10, at 36-48, 53; Eisenberg, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV.,
supra note 30, at 42-99; Comment, 12 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV., supra note
27, at 738.
32. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
33. This decision was made despite the District Court's finding of violation
within the City of Detroit. Id. at 738 n.18.
34. The District Court had already noted the likelihood of this phenomenon.
Id. at 735.
35. See Fiss, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF., supra note 28; Comment, 12 HARV.
Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV., supra note 27.
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status. This conceptualization recognizes the history of a group's dis-
advantaged position and acknowledges that disproportional rep-
resentation may create the appearance of inferiority. The concept is
used in states of affairs that do not amount to total exclusion from a
benefit, that are not directly caused or condoned by the govern-
ment, and in which no individual segregating or discriminating
agent can be identified. Neither individual fault nor intention to dis-
criminate is required for application of the concept."a From this con-
cept comes the responsibility of all major groups in the society-the
government being one of those groups-to remedy the conditions
which have at some time benefitted certain groups at the expense of
a victimized group. The remedies the concept implies may be sweep-
ing37 because of the expanded time focus. This expansion allows in-
quiry into the history of a group's status to determine whether that
status and the property and entitlements claimed by individuals in
the group were the product or the cause of racial segregation. If in-
dividual entitlements are linked to the historic status of a group and
its participation in or benefit from racial discrimination, legal
remedies may invade those entitlements under the liberal pluralist
concept of segregation. 8
The concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Douglas in
Keyes v. School District No. 1," illustrated judicial application of
this concept. The justices suggested abandoning the de jure/de facto
distinction thus making the search for governmental acts and actors
obsolete. Powell argued that in our complex urban society there is
little question of massive government involvement in creating and
sustaining ways of life. Residential living patterns were just one
36. Eisenberg, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. supra note 30; cf. Goodman, De Facto School
Segregation" A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275 (1972);
Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 540 (1977); Note, State Action" Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions
to Private Action, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974); Note, De Facto School Segregation
and the "State Action" Requirement. A Suggested New Approach, 48 IND. L.J. 304
(1973); Comment, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government
Responsibility, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (1972).
37. For the new role and responsibility of the courts in formulating sweeping
remedies for pervasive social problems, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
38. Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The Constitution and Redressing the Social
History of Racism, 14 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 133 (1979) (suggesting the
Constitutional reasonableness and necessity for a legislative finding of widespread and
continuing "societal discrmination"). Cf. Justice Marshall's tracing of the history of
racism in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387-94 (1978).
39. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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aspect of that involvement." The governmental involvement in
racial separation could be taken under judicial notice, thereby ob-
viating the need for proof of governmental responsibility for
segregation. Segregation would be racial separation for which the
government is always responsible either in its role as referee be-
tween competing groups or as a group itself contesting for status
and power. Powell further argued that "once the state has assumed
responsibility for education, local school boards will operate in-
tegrated school systems within their respective districts."'"
The point or purpose of the liberal pluralist concept of segrega-
tion was the imputation of responsibility for remedying conditions
which derogated blacks as a group. The judgment implied by the
concept was that a condition of racial separation disadvantageous to
blacks requires the elimination of that disadvantage. In the case of
schools, this required racial integration. 2
This section of the article has shown how different concepts of
racial segregation group phenomena in different ways. The grouped
phenomena are criteria for the application of the concept. The
grouping depends upon the purpose or point for which the concept
is formed, with different purposes leading to different groupings.
The general purpose of concept formation is to enable the users of
the concept to make judgments about the phenomena grouped by
the concept. Different conceptual groupings lead to different judg-
ments about the phenomena.
Aristocratic, conservative formalist, liberal formalist and
liberal pluralist concepts of racial segregation have different pur-
poses-praising or condemning racial separation, placing or reliev-
ing persons and groups from responsibility for remedies-and dif-
ferent groupings of criteria. Judgments that are implied by using
the concepts may differ widely in terms of the justification of a
situation and the responsibilities and types of remedies allowed.
Moral and legal judgments concern important public policies and
have important political effects. Indeed, the concepts and the judg-
40. Id. at 240.
41. Id. at 252.
42. Similar inferences from the Powell and Douglas concurring opinion were
drawn in contemporaneous analyses of the case. See Fiss, School Desegregation" The
Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 3 (1974); Comment, Keyes v.
School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 124 (1974).
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ments they contain constitute a major part of the social world in
which American politics operates.
3
CONCEPTS AND POLITICAL THEORIES
A critical understanding of the concepts of racial segregation
and the judgments which flow from them requires analysis of the
relationship of these concepts to other important concepts. In these
relationships the concepts of racial segregation influence and are in-
fluenced by more general perspectives on politics and society. Ex-
ploring these relationships reveals the full significance of using one
concept of racial segregation, as opposed to another. The networks
in which the concepts of segregation are linked to other important
and basic social concepts are political theories. These theories pro-
vide general explanations of political life and suggest the purposes
and points from which concepts are formed."
Aristocratic Theory
Each of the concepts of racial segregation is linked by
political theories to other key concepts. The aristocratic concept,
which characterizes racial separation as longstanding, natural and
desirable, relates to concepts of human nature and society through a
political theory that stresses the social nature of human beings and
their natural fitness for established roles in society. An aristocratic
political theory maintains that social structure accommodates the
different moral and intellectual natures of human beings with ap-
propriate social roles. Each role or class has its duties and
privileges. The duties of the higher class are to rule and protect the
lower. The duty of the lower is to serve the higher."5 Cultural dif-
43. See S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974) (an excellent analysis of
the political-social context created by the legal concept of rights).
44. See W. CONNOLLY, supra note 7, at 46-76 (demonstrating the intimate rela-
tionships between differing concepts of interest and theories explanatory of political
phenomena); Dallmayer, Empirical Political Theory and the Image of Man, 2 POLITY
443 (1970) (analyzing the influences of three concepts of man -homo economicus, homo
politicus, and homo sociologicus-on empirical theories of politics); cf. J. COMMONS,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1968) (illustrating the interaction of economic
theory and legal concepts).
45. For more detailed descriptions of this view, see K. DOLBEARE & P.
DOLBEARE, AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES 216-24 (1971), calling this theory "organic conser-
vatism," and E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE (1952), where social "equilibrium" is defined as a
fixed class structure with each class having known duties and privileges. For an ex-
cellent comparing and contrasting of an aristocratic and a conservative formalist view
of human nature, society and politics, see Walzer, Nervous Liberals, 26 NEW YORK
REV. BOOKS 5 (1979).
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ferences, military inferiority and economic need are considered evi-
dence of the natural inferiority of blacks."6 Natural inferiority, in
aristocratic theory, justifies a subordinate social role.
While the Civil War, Emancipation and Reconstruction
eliminated slavery as a possible form of subordination, aristocratic
theory suggests other forms. Aristocratic government provides a
public mechanism for affirming and maintaining the duties and
privileges of the classes. But the primary means of carrying out the
aristocratic duties of governance and protection of the lower classes
is through controlling property, particularly landed property, and
the division of labor."7 Blacks could no longer be held as property,
but their access to property and economic opportunities could be
limited in order to maintain and stigmatize their status as inferior. 8
Thus, an aristocratic political theory incorporates the aristocratic
concept of racial segregation in a structure with broad implications
for human social life.
46. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
47. K. DOLBEARE & P. DOLBEARE, supra note 45, at 222-23; R. UNGER, supra
note 2, at 224-29.
48. This was the intent of the infamous "Black Codes" passed in the Southern
states following the Civil War. E.g., the Black Code of Mississippi contained the follow-
ing provisions:
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi, That
all freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes may ... acquire personal prop-
erty . . . by descent or purchase, and may dispose of the same, in the
same manner .... that white persons may: Provided that the provisions of
this section shall not be so construed as to allow any freedman, free negro
or mulatto, to rent or lease any lands or tenements, except in incor-
porated towns or cities in which places the corporate authorities shall con-
trol the same.
1865 Miss. Laws, ch. IV, § 1, quoted in THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 11, at 37.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi, That
it shall be the duty of all sheriffs, justices of the peace, and other civil of-
ficers of the several counties in this State, to report to the probate courts
of their respective counties, semi-annually, at the January and July terms
of said courts, all freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes, under the age of
eighteen, within their respective counties, beats or districts, who are or-
phans, or whose parents have not the means, or who refuse to provide for
and support said minors, and thereupon it shall be the duty of said pro-
bate court, to order the clerk of said court to apprentice said minors to
some competent and suitable person, on such terms as the court may
direct.... Provided, that the former owner of said minors shall have the
preference. ...
1865 Miss. Laws, ch. IV, § 1, quoted in THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 11, at 39
(indicating also how the crop-lien system was an important aspect of this aristocratic
program of restoring the status quo ante bellun, id. at 41-44).
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Conservative Formalism
The political theory in which the conservative formalist concept
of segregation is embedded, like the aristocratic theory, rests upon
the assumed natural inequality of human beings. Natural inequality
manifests itself in the competition of individuals for survival and
success. Those who succeed in life's competition are natural
superiors; those who fail, natural subordinates.4 9
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this
theory linked Social Darwinism with laissez-faire capitalism. The
link resulted in great ambivalence toward the roles of law and gov-
ernment in society. On the one hand, the theory emphasized the use
of private power to achieve ascendant positions in society. On the
other hand, those who held the theory wished law and government
to actively protect and insure the positions and holdings acquired.
The theory required that government minimize its economic role
while increasing the military role and the role of criminal law in fur-
thering dominant national ambitions and popular prejudices. Such
ambivalence has often resolved itself in the Thucydidean conclusion
that the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they
must.w
Under the conservative formalist theory, blacks are entitled only
to those rights which they can wring from dominant interests and
popular opinion. Their low status indicates their inferiority in the
competition for survival and success and their lack of desert for
rights accorded to whites. Efforts of the national government to
grant rights to blacks are to be construed narrowly because of the
limited role accorded to government by conservative theory. Jim
Crow laws are to be encouraged because of their accord with pop-
ular opinion and dominant local interests. Racial separation, favored
by the opinion of whites, is to be encouraged and protected by the
government. 1 The concept "racial segregation," as it characterizes
49. The Dolbeares call this "individualist-conservatism." K. DOLBEARE & P.
DOLBEARE, supra note 45, at 24-25, 209-15; cf. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
88-119 (1974) (attempting to derive the justice of such an ordering from agreed-upon
first principles).
50. K. DOLBEARE & P. DOLBEARE, supra note 45, at 209-10; Walzer, supra note
45.
51. At the turn of the century, this viewpoint was strongly supported by
leading academics: William Graham Sumner in his influential work FOLKWAYS (1907)
and Ulrich Bonnell Phillips in his heavily-documented AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY
(1908). See also C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 94-96; R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
84-86 (1976).
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something prohibited by federal law, is to be restrictively applied to
minimize the influence of government on dominant local interests.
The rights granted to blacks by the Civil War Amendments are not
considered earned in conservative theory. To the extent they are
recognized by the conservative political theory, they are recognized
as extremely limited in application. Where the rights do not apply,
no duties exist to improve or protect the position of blacks. While
the concept of racial segregation triggers the application of the
rights conferred by the Civil War Amendments, the conservative
formalist concept of segregation does not allow frequent triggering
of these rights. 2
Liberal Formalism.
The emphasis of the liberal formalist concept of segregation
upon the identification of specific acts, agents and victims, fits
within a political theory which views a human being as possessing
capacities or powers. Each human being controls these powers and
exercises them in competition with others. Each not only owns, in a
52. The formalism of this position lies in two factors. The first is the view
that the Civil War Amendments and the acts designed to enforce them did not
prescribe any major change in the treatment of blacks, other than the elimination of
the legal status of master and slave. Therefore, in maintaining legally the subordinate
status of blacks, care must be taken to avoid certain forms of legal expression that
characterized the legal relation of slavery. Second, deference to the formal existence of
the Amendments and the enforcement legislation must be shown in legal reasoning.
The Amendments cannot be ignored, nor their validity denied; they must be formally
applied, but with their effect on action distinguished away. For a more detailed
analysis of formalism in law, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Ad-
judication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1690-95 (1976); and R. UNGER, supra note 2, at
192-205.
An illustration of the conservative formalist viewpoint and its effect on blacks
is the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902, which effectively disenfran-
chised blacks. The following is the statement of Carter Glass on the purpose of that
convention:
Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is
what this Convention was elected for-to discriminate to the very ex-
tremity of permissible action under the limitations of the Federal Con-
stitution, with a view to the elimination of every negro voter who can be
gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength
of the white electorate. As has been said, we have accomplished our pur-
pose strictly within the limitations of the Federal Constitution by
legislating against the characteristics of the black race, and not against
the "race, color or previous condition" of the people themselves. It is a
fine discrimination, indeed that we have practiced in the fabrication of
this plan; . . .
THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 12, 1901 TO JUNE
26, 1902, at 58 (1906), quoted in CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 12, at 143.
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metaphoric sense, his powers, but owns, in a moral and often legal
sense, the fruits of these powers. Property rights are a logical ex-
tension of this view of human nature." From this theoretical posi-
tion, there are no fixed classes or statuses in the society, and one's
abilities, exercised according to just rules, are assumed to generate
one's position and holdings. One's legal and moral rights to his
holdings are determined by one's adherence to the rules governing
the acquisition and transfer of the holdings.'
Since a disparity exists between the holdings and statuses of
blacks as a group in relation to whites, the important issue from the
liberal formalistic perspective is whether each individual holding
was justly acquired, originally and through transfers. Legal in-
terference with individual holdings may therefore be based only
upon fault in the acquisition or maintenance of the holdings. The
holdings must have been acquired or maintained at some point
through a violation of the just rules of acquisition and transfer
before legal action is warranted.
Under legal formalist theories, the Civil War Amendments imply
rules with regard to discrimination and differential treatment of
blacks. Legal entitlement to an improved position or holding is based
upon the extent of damage sustained by a breach of the rules. Legal
redress is compensatory to the limit of restoring the person injured
to the same position he would have held had the breach of rules not
taken place.55 This political theory rests upon the same individualist
concepts of human nature and society associated with the founda-
tions of the modern law of tort and contract. The theory therefore
supports a -concept of racial segregation that incorporates the formal
legal notions of entitlement, fault and compensation found in these
areas of legal doctrine. Thus, the liberal formalist concept empha-
sizes the identification of specific agents, acts and injured victims in
applying the concept to any state of affairs.'
53. For excellent statements of this position with a view to critical analysis,
see C. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 21 (1973); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73
(1971); Schaar, Equality of Opportunity and Beyond, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
THEORY 133 (De Crespigny & Wertheimer ed. 1970); Dallmayer, 2 POLITY, supra note 44,
at 455-58.
54. The Dolbeares call this theory merely "liberalism" but distinguish
American liberalism from older English forms. K. DOLBEARE, & P. DOLBEARE supra
note 45, at 50-69. Cf. R. NOZICK, supra note 49, at 149-82; Kennedy, 89 HARV. L. REV.,
supra note 52, at 1713-16.
55. R. NOZICK, supra note 49, at 54-87; K. DOLBEARE & P. DOLBEARE, supra
note 45, at 69-78.
56. Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 699,
706-11 (1969). For the assumptions underlying the development of the American law of
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Liberal Pluralism
Like the political theory that supports the liberal formalist con-
cept of segregation, the political theory in which the liberal pluralist
concept is embedded views individuals as the bearers of powers and
capacities. The capacities possessed by individuals, however, are only
partial. They cannot be fully actualized except in cooperation with
others. 7 In pluralist political theory, the development of these
capacities occurs in groups-ethnic, neighborhood, family and oc-
cupational. 5'
Between groups, competition rather than cooperation is char-
acteristic. This competition, though, is moderated by the fact that an
individual is a member of several different kinds of groups. Govern-
ment and legal systems serve three functions with respect to the
competition of groups. They establish the forum and rules for group
competition, serve as referees of the competition, and function as
groups with interests of their own in the competition. 9
Within each group, its members' conceptions of successful living
may be shaped by the social conditions of the group. For the mem-
.hers of many groups, the individual accumulation of property and
other resources is a means to realize their conception of living well.
Success depends upon group membership, status within the group
and the status that the group has achieved in competition with
other groups."
Since, according to pluralist theory, individuals receive the
benefits of society and work out their conceptions of success pri-
marily through their group membership, group responsibility and
the redress of group grievances are essential elements of the liberal
pluralist concept of segregation. Blacks, finding both that their life
chances are correlated closely with their ethnic group membership,
and that the status of their group is low, apply the liberal pluralist
tort and contract, see M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 201-10
(1977). A critique of the notion of fault in law can be found in Pashukanis, The General
Theory of Law and Marxism, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 216-21 (Babb trans. 1951).
57. R. UNGER, supra note 2. at 166-68; Dallmayer, 2 POLITY, supra note 44, at
452-53; C. MACPHERSON, supra note 53, at 87.
58. W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 144-54 (1978).
59. Dahl, Critique of the Ruling Elite Model, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 463 (1958);
Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 18 (W. Con-
nolly ed. 1969).
60. K. DOLBEARE AND P. DOLBEARE, supra note 45, at 54-55; Dallmayer, 2 POLI-
TY, supra note 44, at 452-55. For an excellent explanation followed by a critique of
pluralism, see Connolly, note 59 supra.
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concept of racial segregation in a sweeping manner to place respon-
sibility on groups and institutions which do not improve the blacks'
disadvantaged status."
This analysis of the political theories that support the concepts
of racial segregation and tie them to other important concepts sug-
gests that there is a close connection between concept and judg-
ment. This closeness implies that a decisionmaker who understands
these connections and holds strong and consistent positions is con-
strained in his or her choice of a judgment, by the concept he or she
utilizes.2 The next section will show that, despite these constraints,
there are overlaps and indeterminate borderlines between concepts
which may lead to different judgments by holders of the same con-
cept and similar judgments by holders of different concepts. In addi-
tion, litigation is characterized by conceptual disputes over the
points and criteria of important concepts related to differences in
the political theories held by the contestants. Concepts interact
dynamically in the legal system as in other political fora, and this
interaction changes them and the associated theories and judg-
ments.
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND ESSENTIAL CONTESTEDNESS
Conceptual Change
Because of the logical interplay among concepts, theories and
judgments, conceptual change has important political ramifications.
Changes in concepts lead to changes in both judgments and political
theories. These changes are responses to historical forces in the
community.
Concepts change in several ways. In the normal course of social
life, the change takes place at the edges of the concept. The change
61. See, e.g., the analysis and proposals of H. GANS, MORE EQUALITY 134-48
(1974). See generally THE NEGRO AMERICAN (Clark & Parsons ed. 1967).
62. See commentaries cited note 2 supra. See generally Gifford, Decisions,
Decisional Referents, and Administrative Justice, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1972)
(decisionmaking in regulatory agencies utilizes a set of "decisional referents"
developed and internalized in the course of participation in the bureaucratic setting);
Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decisionmaking, 77 YALE L.J. 411 (1968) (judges and
lawyers assign meaning to legal precedents and concepts by referring to general, often
unarticulated, theories, understandings, standards and techniques of interpretation);
and R. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE 85-97 (1978) (regulatory theory and regulatory
decisionmaking have a reciprocal relationship mediated by implicit understandings of
the concepts used in written regulations).
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results through the application of the concept in a new situation,
which is arguably, but not obviously, similar to previous applica-
tions. As the concept is used more often in borderline situations,
pressure for more radical conceptual revision may arise. This occurs
most often with a change in the political theory linked to the con-
cept. The more radical revision may take the form of a change in the
requirements for the application of the concept. This change may
result in borderline instances of application becoming central ex-
amples of application, which in turn would allow for the creation of
new borders of application. The point or purpose of the concept may
also be revised preserving the criteria in the short run. In the long
run, a change in the point of a concept leads to future changes in
criteria which take into account the new perspective and new the-
oretical framework. If the point and criteria remain unchanged
despite much borderline application and pressure for revision, the
concept may fall into disuse and a totally new concept will develop. 3
The concept "racial segregation" has exhibited all but the last type
of change and even the last has been proposed.
That conceptual change is a political process has been central
to the argument of this article thus far. The article has maintained
that concepts are linked to political theories and political judgments.
Historical forces create changes that are worked out in disputes
over the use of concepts. Different groups with differing political
theories use an apparently similar concept in different ways, giving
rise to different judgments. When the concept is an important one,
the dispute has great political significance. The process of change is
political because it relies upon debate and deliberation which are not
logically conclusive but are intended to convince in terms of the
desirability of the judgments flowing from one or the other uses of
the concept. Support for one or another use of a concept is gathered,
and the extent of the support, rather than conclusive proof or ref-
63. W. CONNOLLY, supra note 7, at 31-32. Examples with regard to the concept
of segregation follow in the text. Other examples include: the criteria of the concept
may be revised in order to preserve the function or the point of the concept. The con-
cept "fascism" has been revised in this manner to condemn governments or regimes
which are considered oppressive and militaristic, but that do not subscribe to the
tenets of German, Italian or Spanish fascism. The point of the concept might be re-
vised in order to preserve the criteria. Such may be the case for the concept "intellec-
tual" which over the last twenty years, particularly in the United States, has often
been used as a condemnation. Finally, the point and the criteria may remain unchanged
but the concept itself falls into disuse. The concept "alchemy" is only of historical in-
terest.
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utation, determines the dominance of a conceptual usage." Because
of the nature of legal reasoning, as outlined above, 5 courts easily
lend themselves to this form of political dispute. The use of an im-
portant concept is changed through a series of cases in which each
party and often the judge proffers a different usage.
Essentially Contested Concepts
When uses of a concept are changed in the context of a dispute
the concept is "essentially contested." An essentially contested con-
cept must fulfill four requirements. First, it must be appraisive in
that it is used to value a state of affairs positively or negatively."
Second, it must be internally complex; that is, the use of the concept
requires reference to several aspects of the state of affairs to which
it is applied." Third, despite differences in the usage of the concept,
there is a similarity in the grammar and syntax of each use which in-
dicates that the conceptual dispute is not merely semantic, ie., us-
ing the same words for totally different phenomena. 8 Finally, the
concept is open in that it may be applied to new situations not
previously contemplated by the users of the concept and may be ap-
plied differently in borderline cases. 9 Essential contestedness is the
hallmark of an important political concept in the process of change."'
THE ESSENTIAL CONTESTEDNESS OF THE
CONCEPT "RACIAL SEGREGATION"
The best way to clarify essential contestedness and modes of
conceptual change, while emphasizing the political nature of these
features, is by an extended example using the concept "racial seg-
regation." This example traces the process of change from the con-
servative formalist concept to the liberal formalist concept, as it ap-
peared in desegregation litigation from Plessy to Brown v. Board of
Education.1 Since the Supreme Court's opinion in Plessy has been
64. See generally Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 167 (1956); Perry, Contested Concepts and Hard Cases, 88 ETHICS
20 (1977); cf. Rothstein, 9 J. OF VALUE INQUIRY, supra note 8, at 311.
65. See text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
66. Gallie, 56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y, supra note 64, at 171.
67. Id. at 171-72.
68. Id. at 175-76.
69. Id. at 172.
70. Id. at 186-87. See W. CONNOLLY, supra note 7, at 30-41; Rothstein, 9 J. OF
VALUE INQUIRY, supra note 8, at 311. For an application of this line of argument to
legal reasoning, see E. LEVI, supra note 4, at 5-9.
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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explicated above"2 as an example of the use of the conservative for-
malist concept, this extended example will begin with Justice Har-
72. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra. The full extent of the clash of
concepts in Plessy is revealed in the briefs on Plessy's behalf. They explicitly adopt the
liberal formalist concept of segregation, stressing his entitlements in terms of rights to
equal treatment and property. The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments are re-
garded as the rules by which these entitlements properly may be acquired and main-
tained. Fault on the part of the railroad and the state is established by their departure
from these rules in depriving Plessy of his entitlements. The brief of S.F. Phillips and
F.D. McKenney for Plessy maintained: "What we now submit is that for citizens of the
United States any State statute is unconstitutional that attempts, because of personal
Color to hinder, even if by insult alone, travel along highways, between any points
whatever." Brief of Phillips and McKenney for Plaintiff in Error, at 13, Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
In his brief for Plessy, Albion Tourgee suggested that rights or entitlements
were the distinction between slavery and freedom. "The slave was one who had no
rights-one who differed from the citizen in that he had no civil or political rights and
from the 'free person of color' in that he had no personal rights." Brief of Tourgee and
Walker for Plaintiff in Error at 33.
Tourgee goes so far as to meet the inferiority criteria underlying the
aristocratic and conservative formalist concepts of racial segregation on their own
grounds:
We shall also contend that, in any mixed community, the reputa-
tion of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is
property, in the same sense that a right of action or of inheritance is
property; and that the provisions of the act in question which authorize
an officer of a railroad company to assign a person to a car set apart for a
particular race, enables such officer to deprive him, to a certain extent at
least, of this property-this reputation which has an actual pecuniary
value-'without due process of law,' and are, therefore, in violation of the
Second restrictive clause of the first section of the XIVth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States ...
The man who rides in a car set apart for the colored race, will in-
evitably be regarded as a colored man or at least be suspected of being
one. And the officer has undoubtedly the power to entail upon him such
suspicion. To do so, is to deprive him of 'property' if such reputation is
'property.' Whether it is or not, is for the court to determine from its
knowledge of existing conditions. Perhaps it might not be inappropriate
to suggest some questions which may aid in deciding this inquiry. How
much would it be worth to a young man entering upon the practice of
law, to be regarded as a white man rather than a colored one? Six-
sevenths of the population are white. Nineteen-twentieths of the property
of the country is owned by white people. Ninety-nine hundredths of the
business opportunities are in the control of white people .... Under these
conditions, is it possible to conclude that the reputation of being white is
not property? Indeed, is it not the most valuable sort of property, being
the master-key that unlocks the golden door of opportunity?
Id. at 8-9. Despite a hint of sarcasm, Tourgee goes directly to the quick of the
aristocratic and conservative formalist positions-the assumption and acceptance of
the natural inferiority of blacks justifies racial separation, exclusion and disadvantage.
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lan's dissent, which indicated the essential contestedness of the con-
cept of racial segregation.
The Conceptual Dispute in Plessy
The use of the conservative formalist concept of segregation in
Plessy allowed the Court to hold that a state law requiring separate
accommodations for blacks and whites on trains did not conflict with
the civil and political rights and the equal protection of the laws
mandated by the Civil War Amendments." "Separate- but equal" fa-
cilities were held neither to abridge any entitlements that the states
must protect, nor to stamp blacks with an unearned badge of in-
feriority. The scope of the concept "racial segregation" was so
limited as to preclude its application to racial separation in public
accommodations. Where the state merely enforced longstanding pri-
vate customs and attitudes, the state was not acting to perpetrate
racial segregation. The Court refused to look either at the roots of
the attitudes and customs in slavery and the theories of racial
supremacy that supported it, or at the effects of upholding Jim
Crow legislation.74
In dissent Harlan adopted the liberal formalist concept of
segregation. He noted at the outset the "apparent injustice" of the
separation of the races in passenger train accommodations. He iden-
tified the carrier and the state as the responsible actors: "Thus the
State regulates the use of a public highway by citizens of the United
States solely upon the basis of race .... That a railroad is a public
highway, and the corporation which owns or operates it is in the ex-
ercise of public functions, is not, at this day, to be disputed."7
Harlan tied together the actors and acts with the injury to the vic-
tims by finding the true purpose of the statute and the acts of the
carrier to be "not so much to exclude white persons from railroad
cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches
occupied by or assigned to white persons."77 He went on to state the
At the same time, the bleak statement of the conditions under which blacks must func-
tion raises issues with which the liberal formalist concept of segregation is hard pressed
to deal. Later in his brief, Tourgee stated his view more succinctly and less
metaphorically: "It is an act of race discrimination pure and simple.... Its object is to
separate the Negroes from the whites in public conveyances for the gratification and
recognition of the sentiment of white superiority and white supremacy of right and
power." Id. at 26.
73. 163 U.S. at 550-51.
74. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
75. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 552.
76. Id. at 553.
77. Id. at 557.
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theoretical premises which support the liberal formalist concept:
"[T]here is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens .... The law regards man as man, and takes no account of
his surroundings or of his color.... ."" Prophetically, Harlan concluded
that although the Civil War Amendments validly created new enti-
tlements for blacks, the Court's decisions had opened the door for
states to reverse the process,"9 a task in which Southern and many
Northern states were already engaged."
Both Harlan and the briefs in Plessy placed before the Court a
dispute over the concept "racial segregation." Even the briefs for
Ferguson recognized this dispute and the different implications of
the conservative and liberal formalist concepts. 1 The Court's opin-
ion, however, was written as if the conservative formalist concept
had not been challenged. The Court's concept of segregation was not
changed, but the mechanism for change, a conceptual contest, had
been activated.
From Plessy to Berea College: The Strength of Conservative
Formalism
In Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education,2 decided
three years after Plessy, Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court ac-
cepting the maintenance of a segregated and unequal school system,
showed the limitations of the liberal formalist concept in promoting
desegregation. The Richmond County Board had for "purely eco-
nomic reasons" 3 turned a black high school into a grade school to ac-
commodate the large numbers of black grade school students. The
parents of the dispossessed high school students applied for an in-
junction restraining the board from using tax monies for the opera-
tion of the white high school until such time as equal facilities for
black high school students were available. The schools in Georgia
were required by state law to be segregated. The trial court
granted the injunction and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed.84
78. Id. at 559.
79. Id. at 559-60.
80. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 441-43 (1973); C. WOOD-
WARD, supra note 11, at 67-109; CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 11, at 131-43.
81. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant in Error at 8-14, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), which carefully avoided aristocratic overtones in favor of the conser-
vative formalist position that the Court's duty was to recognize that customary
"private" attitudes about race relations could be a legitimate basis for enforcing
separation whatever the Court thought of the private attitudes.
82. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
83. Id. at 545.
84. Id. at 543.
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The Supreme Court held, speaking through Justice Harlan,
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief requested. Harlan
observed that there was no evidence that the defendants had the de-
sire or purpose to discriminate against black students on account of
race. Moreover, the remedy requested was not directed at correc-
ting the allegedly injurious act."5 Harlan avoided the issues of
whether the state's segregation law was valid and whether the
white high school should have been required to admit the black stu-
dents. He insisted that these issues had not been raised in the
pleadings."
Harlan's liberal formalist concept, by concentrating on specific
acts and actors responsible for racial disadvantage, required clear
evidence of intention to discriminate for its application to conditions
of racial separation and exclusion. The concept only connoted re-
sponsibility to remedy the specific acts of intentional discrimination
whether or not such a remedy would eliminate the separation or ex-
clusion of blacks.
Harlan's opinion for the Court in Cumming illustrated that dif-
fering concepts may at times lead to similar judgments. It further il-
lustrated that the process of conceptual change is not smooth. The
holders of each concept jockey for position and each may appear
dominant for a time and then be subordinated to another position.
Often a new concept achieves a dominant position when it seems to
support many of the same judgments as the old concept. Only later
in a novel situation is the full extent of the change in concepts
recognized. "7 The decision in Cumming represented this aspect of
conceptual change.
In the period following Plessy and Cumming, the conservative
formalist concept and even the aristocratic concept of segregation
demonstrated a resurgence. Social Darwinism, Manifest Destiny and
the economic and political developments which spawned these doc-
trines gave impetus to racism and white supremacy. Jim Crow be-
came a fixture in the South and spread further in the North. Blacks
were excluded from public places and functions. They were almost
completely disenfranchised through registration qualifications, seg-
regated parties and primaries, and violence. In Louisiana, for exam-
ple, the number of registered black voters dropped from 130,334 in
85. Id. at 542.
86. Id. at 544.
87. W. CONNOLLY, supra note 7, at 5-6.
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1896 to 1,342 in 1904.88 Residential segregation greatly increased."
Imperialism forged a new racist link between the North and the
South. Southern leaders felt vindicated by American actions in the
Phillippines and Cuba. Senator John J. McLaurin of South Carolina
publicly thanked Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts "for his
complete announcement of the divine right of the Caucasian to
govern the inferior races."'9
In this context, the liberal formalist position and its supporters
were too weak to counter the resurgence of a concept of segregation
based on white supremacy and approving racial separation. As racial
separation and exclusion became an increasingly important aspect of
domestic and international political and economic developments, the
criteria for the application of the conservative formalist concept to
any instance of separation or exclusion became more rigid and re-
strictive. The link between major political and economic institutions
and racial separation became so strong as to make racial separation
an essential background condition for the institutions. Racial separa-
tion could not then be considered the result of an identifiable act, by
an identifiable actor, causing identifiable injuries. It had to be con-
sidered part of the nature of things. If the institutions themselves
could not be dismantled, then the racial separation and disadvantage
essential to the institutions would have to be ignored. 1
The inability of the Court to maintain Harlan's liberal for-
malist concept of segregation in the face of the doctrine of white
supremacy was made manifest in Berea College v. Kentucky.2 The
state's brief frankly purveyed racist doctrine with little fear of con-
tradiction by the Court:
If the progress, advancement and civilization of the twen-
tieth century is to go forward, then it must be left, not on-
ly to the unadulterated blood of the Anglo-Saxon-
Caucasian race, but to the highest types and geniuses of
that race .... 93
The state's expectations were met. The Court upheld the Kentucky
88. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 85.
89. Id. at 100-01; C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY 14-16 (1967).
90. C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 73.
91. Id. at 102-09; Reich, The Economics of Racism, in PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 107, 109-10 (D. Gordon ed. 1971); P. BARAN & P. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL
249-80 (1966).
92. 211 U.S. 26 (1908).
93. Quoted in R. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 87.
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statute subjecting Berea College to a heavy fine for teaching blacks
and whites on the same campus at the same time.
While Berea College stated the Court's official position on
segregation in education through the first third of the twentieth
century, political action and litigation on behalf of blacks and on
behalf of critical concepts of segregation were proceeding." Some
victories were won, chiefly under the guidance of NAACP lawyers,
in restoring some aspects of the franchise and in remedying separ-
ate but clearly unequal conditions mandated by state law. 5 The ef-
fects of mobilization for massive industrial development and of two
world wars, as well as the devastation of a depression, did much to
limit the acceptability of any aristocratic notions, including those in-
fluencing the concept of racial segregation."
Borderline Changes Leading to Conceptual Reorganization
While lawyers for blacks raised the liberal formalist concept of
segregation in their arguments, the victories were won within the
context of the conservative formalist position and the associated
"separate but equal" doctrine. The period from Berea College to
Brown demonstrates the extension of the borderlines of the conser-
vative formalist concept in such a way as to force the reorganization
94. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 578-79. See generally R. KLUGER, sUpra
note 51, at 84-213; CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 11, at 167-229; C. VOSE, supra note
89, at 9-22; C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 111-27.
95. For cases striking down residential segregation by ordinance, see City of
Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (per curiam), aff'g 37 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1930);
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917). But see Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (upholding racially restrictive
covenants, finding no state action). For cases eliminating aspects of discrimination
against blacks in criminal jury trials, see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935);
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
For cases striking down the "white primary," see Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45
(1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). See
also McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 181 (1914) (reaffirming "separate but
equal" while insisting that considerations of traffic volume do not allow inequality of
facilities); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down the "grandfather
clause" in voter registration).
96. This is not to say that segregation, or arguments for it, were less accep-
table. The grounds of those arguments moved away from aristocratic notions and
toward the individualist, competitive notions of the conservative formalist concept. See
C. WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 115. This is well-illustrated by the contrast between
the Court's treatment of ordinances requiring residential segregation and of private
agreements achieving the same end. See note 95 supra. Cf. the history of the Boswell
Amendment in Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (D. Ala. 1949), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933
(1949).
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of the criteria in a new concept which placed the previously border-
line situations at the center.
Beginning with Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada,"7 the Court
extended the conservative formalist concept of segregation which
had been established in Plessy. At the behest of NAACP attorneys
urging the liberal formalist concept, the Court looked seriously at
racially-separate opportunities in higher education to determine if
they were truly equal. The Gaines case involved a black student
who had been refused admission to the University of Missouri Law
School in accordance with statutorily mandated racially-separate
education. Missouri law had authorized the payment of tuition for at-
tendance at an out-of-state school by blacks denied admission to in-
state schools. Gaines sued. Avoiding any broader discussion of
school segregation, the Court found that the tuition program did not
provide equal facilities. The Court maintained that the responsibility
of the state and the entitlement of the black student was to have
equal facilities within the jurisdiction of the state. 8
The state also was reminded that a limited demand by blacks
for a particular facility did not excuse it from its responsibility to
provide equal facilities:
[Gaines'] right was a personal one. It was as an individual
that he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws,
and the State was bound to furnish him within its borders
facilities for legal education substantially equal to those
which the State there afforded for persons of the white
race, whether or not other negroes sought the same op-
portunity."
The Court used the language of individual entitlement. The extent
of entitlement was limited. As racial separation per se was not
challenged by the Court, the state chose to provide a separate law
school for blacks. The opinion did not go undisputed. Justices
Reynolds and Butler in dissent stated:
For a long time Missouri had acted on the view that the
best interest of her people demands separation of whites
and Negroes in schools. Under the opinion just announced,
I presume she may abandon her law school and thereby
disadvantage her white citizens without improving peti-
tioner's opportunities for legal instruction; or she may
97. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
98. Id. at 344.
99. Id. at 351.
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break down the settled practice concerning separate
schools and thereby, as indicated by experience, damnify
both races. . ...00
Thus, the dissent sought the restricted application of the conser-
vative formalist concept.
As the members of the Court saw it, the dispute was over the
application of the conservative formalist concept in a borderline
case. By applying that concept less restrictively under the influence
of arguments based upon a liberal formalist concept, the Court subtly
shifted the emphasis of the concept and the centrality of its criteria
in the direction of judgments similar to those flowing more ob-
viously from the liberal formalist concept. The significance of the
new emphasis was the reversal of a trend of unquestioning accep-
tance of racial separation in schools.
Three Supreme Court decisions in 1948-50 continued this exten-
sion of the conservative formalist concept and prompted a major
shift in the concept. While the NAACP briefs in Sipuel v. Oklahoma
State Board of Regents,"' Sweatt v. Painter".. and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents"3 clearly advocated a shift from the conser-
vative formalist concept of segregation to the liberal formalist con-
cept, the Court moved slowly toward conceptual revision. The brief
for Sipuel declared:
Classifications and distinctions based on race or color
have no moral or legal validity in our society .... Segrega-
tion in public education helps to preserve a caste system
which is based upon race and color. . . [T]he terms
,separate' and 'equal' cannot be used conjunctively in a
situation of this kind; there can be no separate equality.04
The Sweatt brief stated categorically: "It is clear not only that the
Plessy doctrine ... has not produced equality, but [it] can never pro-
vide the equality required by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 5 Using
the liberal formalist concept, the NAACP briefs asked that the
Court look at the roots and effects of racial separation and hold that
the fourteenth amendment created new entitlements for blacks
which stood above prevailing attitudes and customs.
100. Id. at 353.
101. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
102. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
103. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
104. Quoted in R. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 259.
105. Quoted in CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 11, at 273.
110.
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In a one-paragraph per curiam opinion in the Sipuel case, the
Court held that Ada Sipuel was "entitled to secure legal education
afforded by a state institution" and entitled to receive it as soon as
"applicants of any other group."'0' In another case the Court ordered
that a black student be admitted to the University of Texas Law
School because he was entitled to "legal education equivalent to that
offered by the State to students of other races." Such education
[was] not available to him in a separate law school . . 0 The Court
explained that the law school for blacks "excludes from its student
body members of the racial groups which number 85 percent of the
population of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses,
judges, and other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be
dealing. . . . "" In a companion case, the Court abolished a separate
seating requirement for black graduate students."9 The Court con-
cluded "that the conditions under which this appellant is required to
receive his education deprive him of his personal and present right
to equal protection of the laws."10 "The appellant . . . must receive
the same treatment at the hands of the state as students of other
races . ..."',1
The Court had recognized the realities of the conceptual con-
test and leaned toward the liberal formalist concept at least with
regard to graduate and professional education. Ostensibly the ap-
plication of the conservative formalist concept was broadened by ex-
tending the scope of the criteria. The concept was applied to cir-
cumstances exhibiting a greater range of differential distributions, a
wider time focus and a broader notion of the imputation of inferiority.
This extension of the conservative formalist concept to borderline
situations subverted the purpose of the concept to preserve existing
attitudes, customs, and social relations by restricting the application
of the concept and the consequent responsibility for remedying
racial separation. It remained for Brown to eliminate the contradic-
tion between the original purpose and the newly extended criteria
of the conservative formalist concept by labelling it mistaken and by
explicitly adopting a new concept.
The Adoption of the Liberal Formalist Concept in Brown
The briefs and arguments as well as the decision in Brown v.
106. 332 U.S. at 631.
107. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950).
108. Id. at 634.
109. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
110. Id. at 642.
111. Id.
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Board of Education,"2 reflected the process of conceptual revision.
The initial brief for the black students was short and to the point as
was the later decision. Racially separate facilities imposed by one
race upon another could not be equal. Separation implied and pro-
moted the inferiority of blacks. This was the only consistent ra-
tionale for Gaines through McLaurin and the only consistent ra-
tionale that could characterize decisions in other public areas. The
Plessy doctrine was a mistake which departed from the rationale of
the Civil War Amendments and earlier cases arising under them. In
concluding, the brief for appellants stated:
In any event the assumptions in the Gong Lum"'
case have since been rejected by this Court. In the Gong
Lum case, without "full argument and consideration," the
Court assumed the state had power to make racial distinc-
tions in its public schools without violating the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and assumed
the state and lower federal courts' cases cited in support
of this assumed power had been correctly decided.
Language in Plessy v. Ferguson was cited in support of
these assumptions. These assumptions upon full argument
and consideration were rejected in the McLaurin and
Sweatt cases in relation to racial distinctions in state
graduate and professional education.'
Appellants clearly were seeking conceptual change.
The amici curiae briefs supporting school desegregation echoed
the theme that Plessy and its concept of segregation were an aber-
ration in the judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
The Brief for the United States as amicus curiae first argued that
the Plessy concept was applicable only if racial separation did not
imply inferiority or if the inferiority implied were considered
unremediable. The brief maintained that such situations, if they ex-
isted, were rare.11 5 The brief concluded that: "This judicial contrac-
tion of the constitutional rights secured by the Amendment is ir-
reconcilable with the body of decisions which preceded and followed
Plessy v. Ferguson, and is not justified by the considerations ad-
112. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (no equal protection violation
resulted from exclusion of a child with some Chinese blood from white schools).
114. Brief for Appellants at 12, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 3, 13, Brown v. Board of
Educ.
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duced to support it."".. Not only was the Plessy concept of segrega-
tion inconsistent with prior and subsequent judicial interpretation, it
was also a departure from the concepts which informed the four-
teenth amendment:
In sum, the doctrine of "separate but equal" is an unwar-
ranted departure, based upon dubious assumptions of fact
combined with a disregard of the basic purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, from the fundamental principle
that all Americans, whatever their race or color, stand
equal and alike before the law." 7
The Brief of the American Jewish Congress as amicus curiae
argued similarly that Plessy's concept of segregation was at least
obsolete, if not originally misconceived:
Since both white and Negro view segregation as a method
of asserting and reenforcing the inferiority of the latter
and since in fact segregation statutes have that effect,
this Court should not continue to maintain the erroneous
proposition enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson that laws re-
quiring separation "do not necessarily imply, the infer-
iority of either race to the other.""' 8
On reargument, the attack on Plessy and its concept of
segregation heightened. Over three-quarters of the brief for the
black students was directed at showing that the separate but equal
doctrine was a mistake at the time of its original conception and
that this mistake had been implicitly realized in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, culminating in the McLaurin case. The
amicus curiae briefs in support of desegregation showed a similar
understanding that the conservative formalist concept of segrega-
tion was vulnerable in the Justices' minds and that the time of its
demise had arrived.
The purpose of the arguments was not only to demolish the
conservative formalist concept of segregation embodied in Plessy,
but to substitute for it the liberal formalist concept. The initial Brief
for Appellants in Brown stressed that black students were denied
opportunities by the state for obtaining personal "status, power and
privilege" solely because of their race. That racial separation in the
116. Id. at 23.
117. Id. at 25-26.
118. Brief of the American Jewish Congress as amicus curiae at 15-16, Brown
v. Board of Educ.
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schools intentionally implied the inferiority of blacks was manifested
in the history of segregation and in the present attitudes of the com-
munities involved in segregation. "9 The social science material ap-
pended to the brief was offered as evidence that school segregation
had caused identifiable injuries. In particular, the social science
material suggested that segregation was detrimental to the black
child's ability to function effectively in a world characterized by the
individualistic, rule-bound, competitive theoretical framework in
which the liberal formalist concept of segregation was also embed-
ded. In the social science appendix, segregation was defined in
terms of restrictions on opportunities which do not arise "from the
free movements of individuals which are neither enforced nor sup-
ported by official bodies. . . ."I" The "segregated group" was the one
which explicitly or implicitly had a "lesser social status."
The United States as amicus curiae similarly urged that the
outlawing of racial segregation was an extension of individual free-
dom and entitlement, not a restriction upon it. "'Commingling' be-
tween white and colored persons [could] then result as the product
of voluntary choice, not of legal coercion.'' The American Jewish
Congress urged the liberal formalist concept arguing that the school
segregation laws "eliminate the free play of individualism and force
all without exception, to conform their conduct to the caste
system."" The link between the liberal formalist concept of segrega-
tion and an individualist, competitive theoretical framework was
perhaps best brought out in the amicus brief of the American
Federation of Teachers:
In the segregated school system the growing citizen never
has the chance to show his equal ability; he never has the
"opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students
on his own merits."
He must wait until he has finished what schooling he
gets before he enters the competition. For him "the per-
sonal and present right to the equal protection of the
laws" is of as great practical importance as for the grad-
uate student.2
3
119. Brief for Appellants at 9, Brown v. Board of Educ.
120. Id. at app. 2.
121. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 23, Brown v. Board of
Educ.
122. Brief for the American Jewish Congress as amicus curiae at 8, Brown v.
Board of Educ.
123. Brief for the American Federation of Teachers as amicus curiae at 8,
Brown v. Board of Educ. (citing McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. at 641).
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Thus, the opportunity to compete was a benefit to be achieved by
ending segregation.
Kansas and the Topeka Board of Education strove to maintain
the conservative formalist concept. Their brief stressed that the
Kansas statute merely permitted racial separation at local option in
larger Kansas cities. Several cities had already ended such separa-
tion. Topeka had voted to do so and was beginning to implement its
decision. The brief went so far as to characterize the segregation
statute as "the method provided by the legislature of the State of
Kansas to achieve the goal of an integrated school system where
segregation is not needed."'' Kansas agreed that black students
might be injured by segregation but argued that their injuries did
not rise to a violation of the equal protection clause because they
had not shown that white students were not also injured by segre-
gation. Neither whites nor blacks had the benefits of integrated
education, and neither was constitutionally entitled to them.'25
Several of the Southern states in their briefs and arguments on
implementation of the Brown decision argued for the aristocratic
concept of racial segregation. Milton Korman, arguing for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in Bolling v. Sharpe, stated that racial separation
was not a result of race prejudice but of a "kindly feeling" toward
black children." Lindsay Almond, Attorney General of Virginia, told
the Court that ending segregation in schools would be damaging to
the black because "with the help and the sympathy and the love
and respect of the white people of the South, the colored man has
risen under that educational process to a place of eminence and
respect throughout this nation." He continued, "it has served him
well. . . ."' The Attorney General of Texas ended his argument
before the Court with: "Texas loves its Negro people and Texas will
solve their problems its own way."'2 8 At the same time the inferior-
ity of blacks was underlined as a justification for continued segrega-
tion. The amicus curiae briefs of Florida and North Carolina cited
the poor performance on tests and the high incidence of illegitimate
births and venereal disease among blacks as reasons for not forcing
white students to go to school with them." Archibald Robertson,
124. Brief for Appellees at 31-32, Brown v. Board of Educ.
125. Id. at 37-39.
126. Quoted in R. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 579.
127. Id. at 673.
128. Id. at 734.
129. Brief of the Attorney General of Florida as amicus curiae at 19-21, Brown
v. Board of Educ.; Brief of the Attorney General of North Carolina as amicus curiae at
37-41.
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representing Virginia, reiterated this position adding that "incidence
of disease and illegitimacy were just a drop in the bucket compared
to the promiscuity" to which white parents would not submit their
children.""
The decision in Brown showed the Court's acceptance of the
liberal formalist concept and the political theory in which it was
embedded. Both the decision and the questioning of the justices
showed also that they recognized the essential contestedness of the
concept of segregation and that they were nudging a new use of
that concept into a dominant position. During the oral argument on
December 10, 1952, both Justices Burton and Frankfurter pointedly
questioned John W. Davis about the recognition of change in impor-
tant legal and social concepts. 3 ' The first two questions that the
Court ordered to be reargued concerned the history of the concepts
of segregation and equality under the fourteenth amendment.132
That the central issue upon reargument was which concept of
segregation would prevail was best brought out by an exchange be-
tween Justice Frankfurter and Spottswood Robinson. Robinson had
argued that the history of the fourteenth amendment indicated that
it was intended to remove all racial distinctions in law. School
segregation, being such a distinction, was prohibited by the amend-
ment:
Frankfurter: Namely, they wanted this [amendment] to
put an end to treating white and colored differently
before the law in all its manifestations?
Robinson: This is correct, sir ...
130. Quoted in R. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 733.
131. Record at 3, Dec. 10, 1952 (afternoon), Briggs v. Elliot, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(decided with Brown).
132. The questions were as follows:
1. What-evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and
the state legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not
understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the states in ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would re-
quire the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it
nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might in the exercise of their power
under Sec. 5 of the Amendment, abolish segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future con-
ditions, to construe the amendment as abolishing such segregation
of its own force?
Order, Brown v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
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Frankfurter: Then the question is whether this is one of
its manifestations.133
Later, in questioning Thurgood Marshall, who was one of the
counsel for appellants, Frankfurter emphatically stated: "But the
point is important whether we are to decide that the facilities are
equal or whether one says that is an irrelevant question, because
you cannot apply that test between white and black."
134
The decision of the Court in Brown recognized the essential
contestedness of the concept of segregation. The intentions of the
framers and ratifiers of the Civil War Amendments with regard to
racially-separate education were inconclusive because they held dif-
ferent positions on the concept of segregation; the amendments' ef-
fects on largely undeveloped systems of education were not con-
sidered.1" The question to be answered was which position on the
concept of segregation best characterized the checkered history of
the judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment and best fit
important modern concepts and social theory. Plessy and its conser-
vative formalist concept of segregation was discarded as a short-
lived aberration."3 It did not fit the Court's recent decisions, Gaines
through McLaurin,37 and it did not fit with the modern development
and importance of education."3 It also did not fit with modern social
theory.139 The liberal formalist concept was deemed more ap-
propriate:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms."'
In two sentences the Court had noted the entitlement, the responsi-
bility, the injured party, the culpable act and the competitive theory
of society in which all were linked.
The Court had completed the process of conceptual revision,
my analysis of which began when the conservative formalist concept
133. Record at 12, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134. Id. at 28.
135. 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1954). See also R. KLUGER, supra note 51, at 625-46.
136. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 494.
137. Id. at 491.
138. Id. at 492-93.
139. Id. at 494, 494 n.11. (The note is the well-known social science footnote.)
140. Id. at 493.
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was challenged by Harlan's dissents in Plessy. The first step of the
process was the conceptual dispute. That was followed by the exten-
sion of the dominant concept to borderline situations. This led to a
contradiction between a broadened use of the concept and its pur-
pose of restricting the circumstances to which "racial segregation"
applied. Then came the revision of the purpose of the concept to
place the borderline applications of the conservative formalist con-
cept at the heart of the newly-dominant liberal formalist concept.
Linked to these changes were changes in political theory and
political judgment whose effects would be broader than the specifics
of the Brown decision.
POLITICAL THEORIES, CONCEPTUAL CHOICE
AND JUDICIAL JUDGMENT
That the Brown decision was not just a revision in the concept
of racial segregation and a judgment on but one form of racial sep-
aration did not become immediately obvious. In the years following,
there was much dispute over the significance of Brown."' Supreme
141. The Brown opinion has been the source of much criticism. It has been
criticized as being unclear as to what actually was decided. Critics have also argued
that the opinion did not rely upon precedent or principle and that it appeared to be
judicial legislation. Further criticisms were that it misused non-legal materials, and
that by separating implementation from the declaration of rights, it accomplished
nothing. Often these criticisms were encapsulated in the charge that the decision was
merely symbolic. See C. HYNEMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL (1963); S. WASBY, A.
D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER 95-107 (1977);
Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI L. REV. 45 (1969); Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 32 (1959).
These criticisms miss the point of what the Court did in Brown. In effect, the
Court declared the aristocratic and conservative formalist concepts of segregation in-
valid. It had opened the door to other concepts and favored the dominance of the
liberal formalist concept. It had not foresaken principle and precedent, but had shown
how each was inconclusive in a hard case. Principle and precedent, as well as history
and social theory, had discredited the Plessy doctrine and the aristocratic and conser-
vative formalist concepts of segregation. Because the Court's decision concerned the
meaning of a concept in terms of its relation to other important concepts, all of which
have a history, and the Court thoroughly considered these histories, it cannot be said
that this was legislation as opposed to adjudication. Nor can it be said that the deci-
sion was "merely symbolic." Such a characterization implies a view of concepts and
their relationship to phenomena that is alien to this analysis. To view the decision as
symbolic is to erroneously assume that concepts are symbols which stand for, as a
shorthand notation, groups of facts. Such a view cannot account for the way, as sug-
gested in this essay, in which concepts impart judgments and themselves partly con-
stitute social phenomena. From this erroneous perspective, concepts cannot be essen-
tially contested. See R. FLATHMAN, CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 5-6,
6 n.20 (1973); cf. Rothstein, 9 J. Value Inquiry, supra note 8.
Contrary to those who view Brown as symbolic, other commentators too op-
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timistically characterized the importance of the conceptual change as having "propelled
the nation into the modern era of its on-going revolution in race relations." It became
the "principal ideological engine of today's civil rights movement." Justice Goldberg
commented in the 1960's that the ruling "clarified values and ideals." S. WASBY, A.
D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, supra note 141, at 93.
While noting the impact of conceptual change, these commentators ignored the
nature of conceptual contests and the limitations of the liberal formalist concept. The
Brown decision had not ended the conceptual dispute. The liberal formalist concept of
segregation would be dominant but under attack, and the losing parties and their sym-
pathizers would not immediately give up their concept of segregation. They attempted
to modify the criteria of the newly-dominant concept to retain racially-separate schools
or at least to limit integration. The concept also came under attack from those who felt
that it did not go far enough to eliminate the inferior social and economic position of
blacks. A more balanced assessment of the value and the limits of the decision, but one
which explores the meaning of a conceptual change, was made by Robert Carter, who
had argued the case for the NAACP:
Thus, the psychological dimensions of America's race relations
were completely recast. Blacks were no longer supplicants seeking,
pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged members of the human
race; no longer were they appealing to morality, to conscience, to white
America's better instincts. They were entitled to equal treatment as a
right under the law; when such treatment was denied, they were being
deprived-in fact robbed-of what was legally theirs. As a result, the
Negro was propelled into a stance of insistent militancy. Now he was
demanding-fighting to secure and possess what was rightfully his. The
appeal to morality and to conscience still was valid, of course, but in a na-
tion that was wont to describe itself as a society ruled by law, blacks had
now perhaps the country's most formidable claim to fulfillment of their
desire to become full and equal participants in the mainstream of
American life.
Brown's indirect consequences, therefore, have been awesome. It
has completely altered the style, the spirit, and the stance of race rela-
tions. Yet the pre-existing pattern of white superiority and black subor-
dination remains unchanged; indeed, it is now revealed as a national
rather than a regional phenomenon. Thus, Brown has promised more than
it could give, and therefore has contributed to black alienation and bit-
terness, to a loss of confidence in white institutions, and to the growing
racial polarization of our society .... Few in the country, black or white,
understood in 1954 that racial segregation was merely a symptom, not the
disease; ...
Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 57 (R. Sayler, B. Boyer, R. Gooding eds. 1969).
Criticism of the Court for separating the implementation of a remedy from the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of segregation also fails to grasp the nature of
conceptual contests. The ascendance to legal dominance of one concept of segregation
did not mean the disappearance of other concepts. The dispute still raged under dif-
ferent ground rules, and by separating the consideration or right from remedy, the
Court did provide a forum for the aristocratic and conservative formalist concepts to
reassert themselves in determining the scope of the remedy. On the other hand, the
Court also provided, whether or not intentionally, a forum for other concepts of
segregation to suggest more sweeping remedies. The Court in Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I, in effect subordinated the liberal formalist
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Court decisions in school desegregation litigation since Brown have
shown the significance of that decision as a choice of the political
theory which accompanied the liberal formalist concept of segrega-
tion. The choice of this theory and concept had implications for
judgments on other matters-e.g., neighborhood schools, housing
patterns and the rights of other groups. The history of the period
also demonstrates the limitations of the liberal formalist concept of
segregation and the theory and judgments associated with it for
bringing about an integrated society."' Here again it will be useful
to illustrate these points by an historical analysis of school
desegregation decisions since Brown. In this analysis, a continuing
conceptual contest is revealed and the importance for conceptual
revision of the political theories behind the concepts is made man-
ifest. The political nature of the choice of concepts is confirmed by
the Court's eventual rejection of the liberal pluralist concept of
segregation because of the radical implications of the political
theory which supports it.
Conservative Formalism and Massive Resistance to Desegregation
In the aftermath of Brown, the Court still had to deal with
massive resistance to desegregation based upon the conservative
formalist concept of segregation.143 Cooper v. Aaron... and Griffin v.
School Board of Prince Edward County"4 5 reiterated the reasoning in
Brown and disposed of the two most crude forms of resistance to
desegregation- hostility among the populace generated and sup-
ported by state governmental officials and the closing down of the
entire public school system in favor of segregated private schooling.
In Cooper, the Court emphasized the individual rights and en-
titlements of the excluded black students, holding that these rights
could not be subjected to deprivation because of hostility for which
state officials were responsible.'"
concept, which demanded an immediate and individual vindication of the declared
right, to a concept which recognized the importance of group relations and group
status. This resulted in substantial roadblocks being placed in the way of desegrega-
tion, as the Court retreated from the controversy after Brown. It also resulted in
broad desegregation orders when the Court re-entered the field eight years later.
142. See generally S. WASBY, A. D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, supra note 141; Di-
mond, School Segregation in the North." There Is But One Constitution, 7 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS -CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1972); Motley, From Brown to Bakke: The Long Road to
Equality, 14 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 315 (1979).
143. S. WASHY, A D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, supra note 141, at 162-205; CIVIL
RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 11, at 311-26.
144. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
145. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
146. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at 15.
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In Griffin, the Court found that while the operation of a public
school system was not mandated by the Constitution, closing the
Prince Edward schools was intended to perpetuate segregation in
the county."7 With the requisite intention uncovered, the Court eas-
ily identified the perpetrator, the discriminatory act and the injured
victims. The Court went on to suggest that the responsibility for
remedying segregation in the schools included the duty of county
supervisors to levy taxes to reopen and maintain the public school
system."8 Both opinions stuck close to the liberal formalist concept
of segregation. Because of the passage of time since Brown and the
obvious bad faith of the respondents, the Court was able to affirm
the "personal and present" nature of the black students' rights.
Eight years after Brown II, the Court had begun to move on
to more sophisticated forms of resistance. In 1963, the Court con-
fronted two tactics that had slowed the implementation of the
Brown decision. The Court's handling of these two tactics suggested
that the Court's concept of segregation had limited implications for
racial integration. Both cases concerned policies, neutral on their
face, whose implementation resulted in delaying or preventing de-
segregation. In McNeese v. Board of Education,"9 the Court ruled
that its traditional doctrine requiring the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies before judicial relief could be sought did not apply
to school desegregation. In Goss v. Board of Education," the Court
voided a desegregation plan which consisted of an initial assignment
on a geographic basis and a voluntary transfer provision allowing
students to transfer from a school in which their race was in the
minority to a school in which it was in the majority. In both cases
the Court relied not only on the result--continued racial separa-
tion-but on the intention behind the tactics and the history of
school segregation to declare the tactics discriminatory.51 At a later
date, the Court would be faced with the result only.
From Green to Wright: Openings to the Liberal Pluralist Concept
In Green v. County School Board5 ' and Monroe v. Board of
Commissioners" the Court confronted facially neutral "freedom of
147. Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. at 229.
148. Id. at 233.
149. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
150. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
151. Cf. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103 (1965) ("Delays in
segregating school systems are no longer tolerable." Id. at 105).
152. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
153. 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
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choice" plans. In these cases, the intentions of the school boards in
proposing the policies were not clearly improper. In Green, there
were only two schools and no pattern of residential racial separa-
tion. Prior to Brown, all black children had been assigned to one
school and white children to the other. The racial separation had
continued under post-Brown state pupil placement laws which re-
quired pupils to be reassigned to the schools to which they had been
assigned the previous year. Pupils were then given the option to
transfer out of the schools to which they had been assigned by ap-
plying for reassignment to the school of their choice. This plan was
the original subject matter in the Green case. After the suit was
filed, the county school board adopted a plan whereby each student
would be allowed to choose his or her school at the beginning of
every year.
Under both of these plans, few members of either race asked to
be assigned to the school traditionally attended by the other race."
In striking down the "freedom of choice" plan, the Court in Green
did not look to the intention of the Board, nor to any other specific
act of the Board. It maintained that the Board had an "affirmative
duty" to eliminate the racially-dual system "root and branch" and
"convert to a unitary system.""n The Court required the school
board to effectuate immediate integration.
Two aspects of this decision and the accompanying Monroe
decision stood out as reflecting the liberal pluralist concept of
segregation. The first was the Court's suggestion that the history of
racial separation in the community.was a major factor in imposing
upon the community th- responsibility for immediate deseg-
regation." The second aspect was the Court's concern for the "light
of circumstances" and the factual "context" of the apparently
neutral policies. The circumstance which most concerned the Court
in both cases was the disproportional representation of the races in
the schools. 57 The apparent departure from the language associated
with the liberal- formalist concept of segregation may be explained
as a distortion of that concept caused by the separation of considera-
tions of violation from considerations of remedy. However, the opin-
ions unmistakably de-emphasized the significance of individual
154. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 441-42; Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs of Jackson, 391 U.S. at 453-54.
155. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 437-38.
156. Id. at 437; Monroe Board of Comm'rs of Jackson, 391 U.S. at 453.
157. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 441-42; Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs of Jackson, 391 U.S. at 453-54.
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choice and entitlement under the "freedom of choice" plans. The
Court assumed a condition of disproportional representation was
detrimental to the status of blacks as a group. Bolstering this im-
pression was the Court's quotation in Green from a United States
Commission on Civil Rights report generally deploring the lack of in-
tegration in the South under "freedom of choice" plans.'
The Court gave further encouragement to the liberal pluralist
concept of segregation in the year following Green and Monroe. In
United States v. Montgomery County School Board,"9 the Court
ordered an Alabama county school board to desegregate teachers ac-
cording to a strict mathematical ratio. Three elements implicit in this
decision lent a more critical cutting edge against segregation than
had decisions based on the liberal formalist concept. First, the Court
accepted that underrepresentation in respected positions was an im-
portant aspect of segregation. Second, the Court recognized the his-
toric effects of segregation on this underrepresentation in important
societal positions. Third, the Court accepted the link between school
segregation and a number of factors relating to group power and
status.
Similarly, in Gaston County v. United States,' ostensibly a
Voting Rights Act case, the Court recognized the connections be-
tween school segregation and group underrepresentation in the
resources of political power. Invalidating a literacy test requirement
for voting which barred a higher percentage of blacks than whites,
the Court noted: "It is only reasonable to infer that among black
children compelled to endure a segregated and inferior education
fewer will achieve any given degree of literacy than will their bet-
ter-educated white contemporaries.'.'. The case arose in the context
of Gaston County's effort to reinstate the literacy test requirement;
the requirement was suspended pursuant to the Voting Rights Act,
subject to being reinstated if it could be shown that neither the pur-
pose or effect of the requirement was racial discrimination. 2 The
Court assumed that the manner of administration of the test was
neutral and that school segregation in the county had ceased. The
decision was based upon the effect of the test on group representa-
tion and the history of group status in the community. The Court
158. 391 U.S. at 439-40 n.5.
159. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
160. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
161. Id. at 295.
162. Id. at 287.
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underscored this analysis by a footnote declaring the irrelevance of
whether the present residents of the county had actually gone to its
own segregated schools."'
The Court's apparent acceptance of a concept of segregation
with a more critical cutting edge than the liberal formalist concept
was not lost on the lower federal courts and on attorneys for plain-
tiffs in desegregation cases. Many federal courts routinely based
findings of segregation and remedies upon percentages of pupils of
each race in schools compared to their distribution in the population
of the district."6 ' Questions of group power and status with respect
to school segregation arose in the lower federal courts' considera-
tion of "one-way busing,"'6 5 faculty desegregation,'" and school clos-
ings.
16 7
At issue in these cases were not only the establishment of a
unitary school system but the relative status and access of whites
and blacks in the decisionmaking of the school system and the com-
munity. As one court suggested:
White pupils, realizing that they are permitted to attend
their own neighborhood schools as usual, may come to
regard themselves as "natives" and to resent the negro
children bussed into the white schools every school day as
intruding "foreigners." This undesirable result will not be
nearly so likely if the white children themselves realize
that some of their number are also required to play the
same role at negro neighborhood schools.68
In another case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
desegregation plan accepted by the district court explaining that
163. Id. at 291-93, 293 n.9; cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(holding that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. f§
2000e-2000e-17 (1976), an employer using an apparently neutral employment test which
perpetuates the effects of past discrimination must demonstrate the rationality of the
test with respect to the duties of the job for which the test is required). But see
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
164. See, e.g., Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 404
U.S. 413 (1971); Chambers v. Iredell County Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1970);
Kemp v. Beasley, 423 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1970).
165. See, e.g., Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 350 F. Supp. 879 (D. Conn. 1972).
166. See, e.g. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211
(5th Cir. 1970); cf. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
167. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.
1970); Brice v. Landis, 314 F. Supp. 974 (W.D. Cal. 1969).
168. Brice v. Landis, 314 F. Supp. at 974.
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"there was no explantion offered as to how the school board de-
termined upon particular schools for extinction." ' 9 In the context of
a tri-racial community, pluralism and group status considerations
were determinative despite a specific finding of lack of legal injury:
The district court said that it would "consider the effect
upon [Mexican-Americans] . . . of any plan submitted by
the parties." This was not sufficient. The Mexican-Amer-
ican students must be specifically included in the plan and
its operation. The district court apparently chose to in-
clude Mexican-American students in the elementary
school plan despite the finding of no "de jure" segregation
of Mexican-Americans. 7 '
Such a decision would be impossible under the liberal formalist con-
cept of segregation.
At least as often as the liberal pluralist concept of segregation
was successfully raised, it was raised and rejected in favor of the
liberal formalist concept. The Eighth Circuit, while finding that
black students were entitled to desegregated education, declared
"we do not find constitutional error in ordering the larger, more
populous former white school district to annex that smaller, less
populous former black school district if that annexation does in fact
accomplish a unitary non-racial school system.''
In Southern school cases, the courts were able to flirt with the
liberal pluralist concept of segregation without abandoning the lib-
eral formalist concept. Separating the violation from the remedy
allowed the courts to find identifiable, intentional acts, actors and in-
jured victims by referring to the previous de jure status of, and
delay in remedying, segregation in the South.'72 Once a violation had
been determined consonant with the liberal formalist concept, the
dismantling of the segregated system could be implemented through
sweeping prospective orders embodying the liberal pluralist con-
cept. Those who wished to maintain racially-separate schooling in
the South engaged in the conceptual contest largely by attempting
to limit the application of the liberal formalist concepts and by
169. Felder v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 409 F.2d 1070, 1074 (4th Cir. 1969).
170. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 870 (5th Cir. 1972).
171. Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970).
172. See, e.g., Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970);
Northcross v. Memphis City Schools Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 232 (1970); Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 269
(1969).
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preventing the acceptance of the liberal pluralist concepts of segre-
gation. They were unsuccessful in these tactics with respect to the
courts, although they found a sympathetic ear in President Nixon's
Justice Department.' They also established a conceptual position to
which they could return after the initial dismantling of a segregated
system had been reversed by newly-emerging patterns of residential
racial separation. This position might serve as well to protect racial
separation in school systems, primarily in the North, which had not
been segregated by state law at the time of the Brown decision.
The Supreme Court's ambivalent position on the concept of
segregation in Southern school cases was summed up in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education... and Wright v. Council
of Emporia.7' Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Swann,
despite his professed intention "of defining in more precise terms
than heretofore" the Court's concept of segregation,' reaffirmed
the ambivalent position: "Once a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy
past wrongs is broad. ... ""' He noted that the quality of school
buildings and the racial composition of administrative staff and
faculty are important indications of segregation.' He also noted the
reciprocal effect of racial separation of schools and residential racial
separation.7 " Despite his deprecation of a "fixed mathematical racial
balance reflecting the pupil constituency of the system," he upheld
the district court's requirement of such a balance as "a starting
point in the process of shaping a remedy."'M After reiterating the
separation of violation and remedy, he concluded by opening the
door to a return to the strict application of the liberal formalist con-
cept of segregation:
It does not follow that the communities served by
[unitary] systems will remain demographically stable, for
in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither school
173. In response to increasing white opposition to HEW desegregation efforts,
the Secretary of HEW and the Attorney General issued a joint statement on July 3,
1969, to the effect that too much emphasis had been placed on time limits, coercion and
sanctions, and that some delay in the completion of desegregation might, in ap-
propriate cases, be justified. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 467-68 (1973).
174. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
175. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
176. 402 U.S. at 15.
177. Id. at 17.
178. Id. at 18.
179. Id. at 20-21.
180. Id. at 25.
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authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composi-
tion of student bodies once the affirmative duty to deseg-
regate has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system.'8'
In Wright, the city of Emporia, whose student population was
approximately one-half blacks and one-half whites, withdrew from a
previously segregated, consolidated school system when that system
was ordered desegregated. The outlying county with which the city
had participated in the system had a much higher percentage of
black students. The city neatly placed the choice of concepts before
the Court by claiming:
[The action of the city] may be enjoined only upon a find-
ing either that the state law under which it acted is in-
valid, that the boundaries of the city are drawn so as to
exclude Negroes, or that the disparity of the racial bal-
ance of the city and county schools of itself violates the
Constitution.'2
The Court made no such findings and yet held that the withdrawal
of the city from the consolidated system would not be allowed.
The Court noted that the timing of the city's action might give
rise to a finding of a purpose or intention to segregate, but discarded
that view, stating: "Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the
purpose or motivation-of a school board's action in determining
whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a dual system.
The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that
has an impermissible effect." ' 3 Noting the percentage disparities in
racial composition between the city and the county, the Court
declared: "We need not and do not hold that this disparity in the
racial composition of the two systems would be a sufficient reason,
standing alone, to enjoin the creation of a new school district.""' If,
however, the purpose were irrelevant, and if there were a substan-
tial number of blacks in both school districts, and the withdrawal
from the consolidated district was supported by other non-racial con-
siderations, then the numerical balance of the races seems the only
possible basis for the decision. The Court, per Justice Stewart, con-
cluded, as in Swann, that the withdrawal of the city was not indefi-
181. Id. at 22.
182. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 459.
183. Id. at 465.
184. Id. at 467.
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nitely precluded, but only precluded until a unitary system was es-
tablished."5 The Court further manifested its ambivalence by
stating, contrary to its opinion in Swann, that future white flight
from the county system was a ground for preventing the city's
withdrawal. 86
Chief Justice Burger did not increase clarity in his dissent. He
called the Court's "racial balancing" pointless because of the effects
of population shifts, and concluded that the likelihood of white flight
was "highly speculative." '187 This confusion and the heightening of
the conceptual dispute was also related to the shift of the Court's
focus to school districts which had not been segregated by state law
at the time of the Brown decision.
Northern School Desegregation: The Retrenchment of Liberal
Formalism
Keyes v. School District No. 1,188 arising in Denver, Colorado,
provided a situation in which the Court could resolve the am-
bivalence over its concept of segregation or at least lean more
toward the concept which would inform its future decisions. The
school district had not been segregated by state law but minority
students had been generally confined to specific schools serving a
residential section in which minority population was high. The lower
court found that schools in this residential section had been segre-
gated partly as a result of the siting of new schools, the placement
of mobile classrooms, the changing of boundary lines, the assign-
ment of staff and faculty, and the granting of transfers to white
students. There was no such finding with regard to schools in other
residential sections of the school district.
The petition for certiorari noted the conceptual dispute be-
tween the parties to the case and between conflicting lower court
opinions:
Where this Court and the lower courts require desegrega-
tion throughout a southern school district where segrega-
tion was imposed by law (even though it persists only in
certain portions of that district), the lower courts here
(and in some other places) have confined desegregation to
185. Id. at 470.
186. Id. at 473.
187. Id. at 475.
188. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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discrete areas where particular segregating deeds have
been uncovered and identified. "
These courts had applied a strict liberal formalist concept of
segregation to racial separation in Northern schools, thereby limit-
ing the responsibility for remedy to just that necessary to eliminate
the specific acts identified and their direct effects. As respondents
stated flatly: "This case does not involve a racially-segregated school
system created or aggravated by the defendants.""0
Both the district court and the court of appeals concluded that
"the Constitution allows separate facilities for races when their ex-
istence is not state imposed" and when they provide equal educa-
tional opportunity."" The Brief for Petitioners urged the Court to
look to the reality of racial antagonism and the condition of racial
separation as establishing a prima facie case of segregation and rule
that "the board should bear the burden of justifying racially-
disproportionate schools" with compelling reasons. 9 ' The briefs
made clear that Petitioners were asking the Court to move toward
the liberal pluralist concept of segregation while the Respondents
were requesting a strict adherence to the liberal formalist concept.
The Court sided with the petitioners, attempting at the same
time to keep their toehold on the liberal formalist concept. The
Court held that proof of specific discriminatory acts with respect to
one part of the system, and disproportionate racial concentrations in
other parts of the system, permitted the evidentiary inference that
the disproportionate concentrations were the result of prior
discriminatory acts or the indirect result of the proven acts.'93 This
established a prima facie case of system-wide segregation which
obligated the school board to show compelling non-discriminatory
reasons for their decisions on school policy. A policy of neigh-
borhood school assignment was not in itself compelling where a dif-
ferent application of that policy or other reasonable policies could
have eliminated or lessened the disproportionate racial concentra-
tions in the schools.' This represented a clear move closer to the
liberal pluralist concept of segregation with its emphasis on condi-
tions of disproportionate concentration rather than specific actors
189. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973).
190. Brief of Respondents in Opposition at 6, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1.
191. Id. at 10.
192. Brief for Petitioners at 91, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1.
193. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at 193.
194. Id. at 195.
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and acts.195 The criteria of the liberal formalist concept had been
broadened to the point where only remote and partial connections to
specific governmental acts were required for segregation. The link
which had been provided by discriminatory intent was provided by
foreseeability, ie., merely that continued (not necessarily newly-
created) or increased racial separation in schools could have been
foreseen as the result of governmental policies in a context of
residential racial separation.1"
There seemed to be only a short distance between this
broadened version of the liberal formalist concept and the forthright
embrace of the liberal pluralist concept. Indeed, two members of the
Keyes Court took this step. 197 Had this step been taken by the full
Court, it may have pushed the concept "racial segregation" some
distance toward obsolescence. The central concept in dealing with
racial representation in schools and other institutions or positions
would have become "integration." At the very least, policy makers
would have been placed on notice that they were responsible for,
and must justify, the effects of any policy on school integration.. 8
The Supreme Court did not cross the seemingly short space
which separated it from embracing the liberal pluralist concept of
segregation. In fact, it began to restrict the criteria for applying the
concept of segregation. The first such restriction was in the spatial
or geographical dimension of application.'"
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school
districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate
units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district
remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a con-
stitutional violation within one district that produces a
significant segregative effect in another district. Specif-
ically, it must be shown that racially-discriminatory acts
of the state or local school districts, or of a single school
district have been a substantial cause of inter-district seg-
regation. Thus an inter-district remedy might be in order
where the racially-discriminatory acts of one or more
school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent
195. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of foreseeability in segregation cases, see Comment, 12
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv LiB. L. REV., supra note 27, at 731-33.
197. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
198. W. CONNOLLY, supra note 7, at 198-205.
199. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
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district, or where district lines have been deliberately
drawn on the basis of race. In such circumstances an
inter-district remedy would be appropriate to eliminate
the inter-district segregation directly caused-by the con-
stitutional violation.'
The suburban communities were not to be held responsible for, and
need not justify, segregation without the showing of some act on
their part pertaining directly to education and having both a
racially-isolating effect and racially-discriminatory purpose. The
burden of proof was placed upon those who urged inter-district
desegregation and was not to be shifted because of the obvious
racial isolation of both the suburban and city schools."'1
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler..2 further limited
the application of the concept of segregation. This limitation related
to the time aspects of the concept. The Court refused to apply the
concept to racial separation in the school system which occurred
after a desegregation order had been implemented. The new racial
separation was the result of population shifts within the district
which the Court termed a "normal pattern of human migration." 3
No one, particularly not government, was to be held responsible for
this, although it was certainly not an unforeseeable consequence of
the earlier segregation and the later desegregation order.
The dominance of a strict liberal formalist concept of segrega-
tion in school cases was confirmed in a series of cases remanded to
the lower federal courts for reconsideration in the light of Wash-
ington v. Davis."' Davis, an employment case, had revived proof of a
racially-discriminatory intent or purpose as a requirement for a four-
teenth amendment violation and had markedly reduced the weight
of racially-disproportionate impact as evidence of discrimination. In
Austin Independent School District v. United States,"5 Justices
Powell, Burger and Rehnquist, concurring in the remand, completely
ignored the history of racial separation and quoted favorably from
200. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
201. See Note, Interdistrict Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 521 (1976).
202. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
203. Id. at 436. For an excellent analysis of the contrary position, see Com-
ment, Housing Remedies in School Desegregation Cases: The View from Indianapolis,
12 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 649 (1977).
204. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
205. 429 U.S. 990, vacating and remanding per curiam, United States v. Texas
Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1976).
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the Government's brief: "there is nothing inherently inferior about
all-black schools, any more than all-white schools are inferior, when
the separation is not caused by state action.""6 Such a statement
opens the way for a further retreat to the conservative formalist
position.
In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 7 the Court va-
cated and remanded a court of appeals decision which had mandated
system-wide desegregation based upon the district court's finding
that three specific incidents of discrimination by the Board resulted
in a "cumulative violation."2 °8 The court of appeals had affirmed the
findings of violation but had expressed disapproval of the district
court's limited remedy. The Supreme Court rejected the system-
wide desegregation mandated by the court of appeals, and held that
such a remedy would be justified only by a finding of a systemwide
discriminatory purpose. 9 With regard to remedy, the Court stated:
[I]nstead of tailoring a remedy commensurate to the three
specific violations, the Court of Appeals imposed a
systemwide remedy going beyond their scope.
' * * [T]he Court of Appeals ... was vaguely dissatis-
fied with the limited character of the remedy which the
District Court had afforded plaintiffs, and proceeded to in-
stitute a far more sweeping one of its own, without in any
way upsetting the District Court's findings of fact or
reversing its conclusions of law. 1 '
Thus, the Court maintained that the remedy must match the proven
constitutional violations.
Two days after the Dayton remand, the Court reaffirmed its
return to liberal formalism in School District v. United States,"'
known as Omaha II. This was the latest stage in a complex desegre-
gation case. In Omaha ,21 the Eighth Circuit adopted a test for
systemwide discrimination, later called the "Omaha presumption,"
which followed the Keyes decision. Plaintiffs were held to have
established a prima facie case of segregation by showing that a
206. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. at 992 n.2
(quoting Brief for the United States at 8 n.5).
207. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
208. Id. at 413-17.
209. Id. at 419-20.
210. Id. at 417-18.
211. 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam).
212. School Dist. v. United States, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 946 (1976).
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challenged policy for school enrollment had a foreseeable result of
disproportionate racial concentration. The school board then had the
burden to show that the policy was instituted entirely for legitimate
reasons and free of any taint of discriminatory motivation. After the
Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, the Court of Ap-
peals in Omaha IP1" reaffirmed its decision in Omaha I, finding it
consistent with Davis and ordering a systemwide remedy. In a per
curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Omaha
II:
[Tihe District Court in the first instance, subject to review
by the Court of Appeals, must determine how much incre-
mental segregative effect these violations had on the
racial distribution of the Dayton school population as pres-
ently constituted, when that distribution is compared to
what it would have been in the absence of such constitu-
tional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress
that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide
impact may there be a systemwide remedy. " '
With these decisions, the Court has accepted a strict liberal formal-
ist concept of segregation, likening it to traditional torts and ap-
plying the "but for" and "proximate cause" tests.215 Identifiable ac-
tors, acts and injuries had to be determined so as to determine who
was at fault and who was entitled to relief. The Court had prepared
the way for accepting findings of no segregation in instances where
an enclave of schools in which all of the students are black are sur-
rounded by schools in which all of the students are white.
CONCLUSION
The Dangers of Liberal Pluralism
The Court's retreat from the liberal pluralist concept of
segregation cannot simply be explained as the result of the appoint-
ment by Nixon and Ford of racist Justices to the Supreme Court or
213. 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc, per curiam), vacated and remanded,
433 U.S. 667 (1977).
214. 433 U.S. at 668-69 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,
420 (1977)).
215. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971). See
generally Eisenberg, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 30; Comment, 12 HARV. CiV.
RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV., supra note 28. For tort-like tests of causation in other civil
rights matters, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376-77 (1976) (police violations of
rights); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502-07 (1975) (exclusionary zoning).
Rothstein: The Politics of Legal Reasoning: Conceptual Contests and Racial S
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
134 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
even the appointment of Justices willing to accept the racism of
others. The retreat is more symptomatic of economic and political
conservatism and a touch of political cynicism than it is of racist
attitudes. Neither may it be explained by assuming that at least a
majority of the Court finds the liberal formalist concept to "fit" best
with the concepts and values which characterize American society.
Americans have a strong sense of entitlement to their holdings, but
also a strong sense of corrective justice where it can be shown that
someone has been unfairly disadvantaged.
Government in liberal formalist theory is merely a tool by
which one is assured that legitimate expectations, based on one's in-
herent capacities and prior holdings, will be met. This simple expla-
nation conflicts in part with the Court's rulings granting the govern-
ment substantial power to revoke individual entitlements and disap-
point settled expectations in matters other than racial segregation.216
It discounts the willingness of the justices prior to Milliken to flirt
with the liberal pluralist concept before decisively rejecting it. The
contrast between Justice Powell's concurrence in Keyes and his ap-
proving quote from the Government's brief in Austin is difficult to
explain in terms of a simple acceptance of liberal formalism as most
fitting.17 It would be an insult to the intelligence of the Justices to
suggest that they are ignorant of the history of race relations in this
country that led to the disproportionate racial concentrations in
schools. They could not accept these concentrations as products of
the legitimate entitlements of all concerned. Neither could they be
unaware that, at least since Brown, blacks have been led to expect
that they are entitled to integrated schools.
Given these anomalies, a more successful, but less simple, ex-
planation might look to the rejection of the political theory support-
ing the liberal pluralist concept of segregation. 18 The danger of the
liberal pluralist theory from the Court's viewpoint is that it implies
the importance and justification of collective political and economic
grievances and collective action. The theoretical framework does not
preclude a class analysis of these grievances, as classes are them-
216. See, e.g., cases with regard to expectations of continued employment.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Also
worth noting are cases with regard to protection from release of erroneous and con-
fidential information. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976).
217. Compare notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text with note 206 supra
and accompanying text.
218. For the liberal pluralist theory, see notes 60-61 supra and accompanying
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selves groups. 19 Finally, the situation of blacks tends to destroy the
moderating assumptions of the liberal pluralist framework-that one
is a member of several important groups each of which contributes
to his status. Blacks find their life chances dictated by their
membership in two groups, the first based on their race and the sec-
ond based on their economic class. The sweeping remedies for the
disproportionate disadvantage of blacks implied by the liberal
pluralist concept would have profound effects on economic pro-
cesses. Merit-based advancement, differential reward based upon
"functional importance," management prerogatives, property and
the division of labor itself could be called into question when deci-
sions previously characterized as "private economic" are subjected
to criteria which are clearly "sociopolitical."' These are exactly the
issues which have been recently raised in the Bakke and Weber
cases.21
Legal Criticism as Political Criticism
The Court may no longer desire to be the forum in which im-
portant political issues are raised and provisionally settled. The
problem is, of course, that it cannot avoid doing this. The Court can
merely choose to conceal the moral and political importance of its
conceptual choices and the theories which inform them; it cannot
diminish their importance. The Court functions politically when it
performs its most characteristic tasks-using legal concepts, analyz-
ing, comparing and contrasting cases. These tasks are intimately
linked to political theories. The political theories, and the conceptual
choices to which they are joined, must be exposed to public view
and comment, for political theories represent views about what the
lives of people in a community ought to be like. This is the quintes-
sential political question. In this sense, the role of the judge and
the legislator is similar. Both are engaged in the public process of
understanding these views and making decisions which embody
them. To perform his task properly, the judge must articulate in his
decision the political theory, concept, judgment and their relation-
ships as developed in the history of his community. He must also ex-
219. This is the general trend of "post-liberal" social analysis. See, e.g., R.
Unger, supra note 2; W. CONNOLLY, supra note 9; cf. Rothstein, The Myth of Sisyphus:
Legal Services Efforts on Behalf of the Poor, U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 493 (1974); P.
BARAN & P. SWEEZY, supra note 91; S. ARONOWITz. FALSE PROMISES 185-98 (1973).
220. See commentaries cited in note 53 supra.
221. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (challenging
preferential admissions program for minority students); United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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plain his rejection of alternatives to the extent that he perceives
them. The latter is the essential difference between the formal tasks
of judge and legislator.
The mode of analysis suggested in this article as an alternative
to positivist jurisprudence has two levels. The preliminary level con-
cerns the failure of court decisions to meet the requirement of artic-
ulation. The article has shown how in the context of racial discrim-
ination the Court has not fully articulated the pertinent concepts,
theories and judgments. Only after the preliminary articulation is
done, either by an informed court or a commentator, may the crit-
icism move to the advanced level. At this level, criticism is directed
to the political theory behind a court's decision. The theory is tested
for its power to detect and explain important phenomena. Its im-
plications for concepts and judgments beyond the subject matter of
the case at bar are explored. It is confronted by arguments from
alternative theories and compared with the concepts, judgments and
explanatory powers of the alternatives. By engaging in both
preliminary and advanced analysis of court opinions, legal commen-
tators must show the way for judges to achieve an awareness of
the full political import of their actions-an import which positivist
jurisprudence hides.2
222. See generally authorities cited in note 2 supra; W. CONNOLLY, supra note
9, at 57-65; d'Errico, A Critique of "Critical Social Thought About Law" and Some
Comments on Decoding Capitalist Culture, 4 A.L.S.A. FORUM 39 (1969); Goldberg,
Political Lawyering in "Non-Political" Cases: Some Theoretical Considerations, 4
A.L.S.A. FORUM 57 (1969); d'Errico, Arons, & Rifkin, Humanistic Legal Studies at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 32-34 (1976); Villmoare,
The Judiciary in the Context of the State: Liberal Radical and Technocratic Perspec-
tives, 4 A.L.S.A. FORUM 7 (1979).
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